DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 345 983 SO 022 089

AUTHOR Smith, Michael C., Ed.; Dupuis, Adrian, Ed.
TITLE Proceedings of the Annual Conference of the Midwest Philosophy of Education Society (Chicago, Illinois, November 9-10, 1979).
INSTITUTION Midwest Philosophy of Education Society.
PUB DATE 82
NOTE 92p.; For related documents, see SO 022 090-093 and ED 319 670.
PUB TYPE Collected Works - Conference Proceedings (021)

EDRS PRICE MF01/PC04 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS *Educational History; *Educational Objectives; *Educational Philosophy; Educational Responsibility; *Educational Theories; Feminism; Teaching Methods
IDENTIFIERS Dewey (John); Goodman (Paul); Marx (Karl); Spalding (John Lancaster)

ABSTRACT

Six papers presented by philosophy of education specialists are gathered in this volume. The first, "Implications in Dewey for Feminist Theory in Education" by Wilma R. Miranda, discusses the social thought of John Dewey and argues that domestic virtues are significant as modes of political action. In "Jim Teaches Fang to Sit," James F. Andris analyzes the logical conditions for teaching a dog a new trick and relates these to recent contributions to the philosophical analysis of teaching. Robert Newton Barger in "The Influence of J. L. Spalding's Educational Theory on His Theology" traces the development of J. L. Spalding's theological thought from about 1880 and how it influenced his education theory. The fourth paper, "Intermediate between Clicking and Ringing: The Jingle-Jangle Fallacies" by Walter P. Krolikowski, examines how a term coined by a philosopher-psychologist is adopted and adapted by four later scholars, each finding it of use just as long as it was somewhat changed. Michael C. Smith in "Karl Marx's Philosophy of Education: A Reconstruction of Marx's Ideas on Education" reconsiders the importance of Marx's work to current discussions in the philosophy of education. In the final paper, "Paul Goodman as a Twentieth Century Advocate of a Socratic Educational Philosophy," Ronald Swartz explores how Goodman's educational philosophy is relevant for 20th century schooling. (KM)

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MIDWEST PHILOSOPHY of EDUCATION SOCIETY

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PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE MIDWEST PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION SOCIETY 1979

Edited

by

Michael C. Smith
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee

and

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ANNUAL CONFERENCE

MIDWEST PHILOSOPHY

OF EDUCATION

SOCIETY

CONFERENCE

NOVEMBER 9-10, 1979

Loyola University

of Chicago

Chicago, Illinois

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The Proceedings of the Society serve two important purposes. It is the official record of the Annual Meeting of the Society and it makes available to other philosophers and the public some of the outstanding works being done in the Mid-West by Society members.

In today's era of "publish or perish" it should be particularly noted that the papers included have been "peer reviewed" by the Program Committee, and have been deemed to represent the high standards of the Society. Thus, inclusion acknowledges the high quality of their scholarship, originality, and their contribution to the philosophy of education.

Our compliments to the Program Committee for a fine job of selection, as well as to each of the writers.

We also wish to acknowledge special persons who contributed to this publication. First, our appreciation to Ms. Rosi Hauber for her expertise and labor in preparing the manuscript. Secondly, our gratitude to the Graduate College and College of Education, Iowa State University for their financial and staff support in the publication of these materials. Finally, special thanks to the President of the Society, Professor George Kizer, for his active support and suggestions.

Michael C. Smith
Adrian M. Dupuis

Annual Conference

MIDWEST PHILSOPHY OF EDUCATION SOCIETY

November 9-10, 1979
Loyola University of Chicago

Hosts: Rosemary Donatelli and Walter Krolikowski

PROGRAM

Friday, November 9, 1979

12:30-1:00 p.m.	Registration: Marquette Center
1:00-4:00 p.m.	First General Session: Regis Room, Marquette Center
"Implications in Dewey for Feminist Theory in Education"	Dr. Wilma Miranda, Professor of Educational Foundations, Northern Illinois University
"Jim Teaches Fang to Sit"	James F. Andris, Assistant Professor, Social Foundations, Southern Illinois University at Edwardsville

INTERMISSION

An Exercise in Obscurity

"The Influence of J. L. Spalding's Educational Theory on His Theology"	Robert Newton Barger, Eastern Illinois University, Charleston, Illinois
"Intermediate Between Clinking and Ringing: The Jingle-Jangle Fallacies"	Walter P. Krolikowski, Loyola University of Chicago
4:45-5:45 p.m.	Hospitality Hour: Marquette Center Room to be Announced
6:00-7:30 p.m.	Dinner: Try one of the many fine restaurants in the area

7:30-9:00 p.m.	Roundtable Discussions: Marquette Center

Educational Vouchers: A Crisis in Confidence?

or,

Carter's Department of Education: Boon or Bane?

Saturday, November 10, 1979

9:00-11:00 a.m.	Second General Session: Regis Room
"Karl Marx's Philosophy of Education: A Reconstruction of Marx's Ideas on Education"	Dr. Michael Smith, Professor of Community Education, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, Wisconsin
"Paul Goodman as a Twentieth Century Advocate of a Socratic Educational Philosophy"	Ronald Swartz, Oakland University Rochester, Michigan
11:00-12:00 p.m.	Business Session
12:15 p.m.	Adjournment

IMPLICATIONS IN DEWEY FOR FEMINIST THEORY IN EDUCATION

Wilma R. Miranda
Northern Illinois University

This paper considers the social thought of John Dewey in its aspect as an argument for the significance of "domestic" virtues as modes of political action. I will argue that 'democracy', Dewey's basic principle of social change, takes the norms of well-run family life, strips them of their sentimentality and releases them from their assumed isolation in the private domain. Thus freed, qualities of service, orderliness, and love achieve in his thought the status of moving social forces. They became currents which, when properly understood and directed, lead toward the achievement of community. Dewey's observation that the well-run school is much like the well-run home characterizes, I believe, his attitude toward all 'public' institutions. Three familiar aspects of his work will be discussed in behalf of the claim that much of its paradoxical implication for women in the schools is located in its sophisticated theoretical feminism. They are: 1) his understanding of the school as a 'public' institution, 2) the designation of morality as a 'force' in the world, and 3) his unusual linkage of the concepts of freedom and service. An assumption of this analysis is that Dewey's thought was influenced by and continuous with the domestic feminism of the late nineteenth century. This influence still generates both conservative and radical influence on educational discourse today.

A word is necessary about the context of Dewey's educational thought at the end of the last century. The dilemmas facing women as a result of modernization had long been relentlessly enervating. Cut off both from public activities in the trades and professions and productive work formerly done in the home, women often lapsed into fatalism, illness, or another worldly religious euphoria. The nineteenth century middle classes provided a new stereotype of female emotional excess. Yet the obverse of this image was one of hyper-practicality and self-sacrificing service. The glorification of this combination of vulnerability and superiority, known as the "cult of domesticity"[1] redeemed a deficit condition by granting women transcendent spiritual power.

The moral, economic, and psychological ghettoization of women was thus presented as both natural and the ideal. In

religious terms at least the power of women was specific and real. She had power in her capacity to transform the moral quality of life through pure sustained example. Women came to monopolize what eighteenth century America had taken to be Christian virtues appropriate to both sexes. As a consequence, certain moral characteristics were cloistered in the home right along with their female exemplars. Moral strength was linked with fragile natures in need of physical, emotional, and intellectual protection. The unconscious content of this ideology was the logical justification for female claims to secular as well as spiritual power.[2] As the century waned, fatalistic attitudes gave way to public stated concern for such issues as maternal and infant mortality, public health in general, and of course, public education. It was the public school, particularly the urban public school, which provided the most stable institutional support for women's reform efforts. It aided them in their effort to "shift domestic power in their favor."[3] Ascribed traits of moral superiority led to a "domestic feminism" that asserted responsibility for social conditions within and beyond the home. Jane Addams and Ella Flagg Young, both friends of Dewey, exemplify the new public presence of women.

Domestic feminism hypostasized the virtures of the private domain of women and used them as a justification for claims to broader political participation. Service, uncomplaining submission, and sentiment were ingredients in the ideal of female moral excellence. By claiming a special moral universe for women, domestic feminism asserted transcendent meaning as a special mode of knowing. Under certain circumstances, this knowledge might be the justification for the right of women to work for political change. The material social basis of this ideology was, of course, the family.

In turning directly to Dewey we find the view that machine industrialization is disintegrating to family life. In an approving discussion of the Soviet Union's conscious attempt to break down the family, he terms it an interesting "experiment" whose consequence will give us important information. It should . . . "do something to determine how far the bonds that held the traditional family together are intrinsic and how far due to extraneous causes; and how far the family in its accustomed form is a truly socializing agency and how far a breeder of non-social interests.[4] He argues that with the erosion of the family a conscious policy to use the school in the interest of social value is called for. All modern schooling, he suggests, shares this role "of building up forces and factors whose natural effect is to undermine . . . the uniqueness of family life."[5] He

gives cautious applause to making such a role deliberate. The issue for Dewey is not the family itself but the democratic values generates there, i.e., mutuality, communication, equality.

> A baby in the family is equal with others, not because of some antecedent and structural quality which is the same as that of others, but in so far as his needs . . . are attended to without being sacrificed to the superior strength, possessions, and matured abilities of others.[6]

The problem, under conditions of modernization, is to demystify the family as some sort of ultimate social unit while retaining its communitarian ethos. A closed world of the family could only stand as a block against Dewey's hopes for fuller democratic arrangements. For the qualities bottled up there would have no hope of affecting the conditions in 'the real world.' To glorify the 'family' while modern conditions eroded it was to build a trap. A new institution was emerging, one where transactions between people extended beyond those directly involved. It called into being a "public," with a common interest in controlling the consequences of those transactions. The school, as a public institution in this sense, would be a necessarily less narrow and more humane agency than the family. On Dewey's view publics arose as social conditions changed. They were created by the "extensive and enduring indirect consequences" of "conjoint behavior."[7] Women and children of all classes both in the home and community, were constituents then of a new 'public'. They represented a huge potential for change, standing as they did between the developing school and the shrinking family. As the church receded into the private domain, the school became for women, not only a link to the public world, but a public institution they could shape. Dewey's definition of 'public' as including all those affected by the consequences of the schooling effort, provided for the broadest possible argument for participation in its governance and direction.

Dewey's thought on the social nature of the child is particularly interesting in this regard. In Experience and Education he removes himself from those who advocate the child-centered classroom. For this would simply be an imitation of the private nature of the family where the consequences of transactions are confined to persons directly engaged in them. Instead, he opts for a position far more subversive. As C. Wright Mills complains, he "put the child at the very center of social change."[8] Coupled with Dewey's laudatory definition of 'community' and 'public' this seemed to Mills and

other critics an incredible evasion of political realities. If, as Dewey contends, he takes the meaning of this concept from historical and social experience, then Mills wants him to show us even one such 'community'. Yet, for Dewey, 'community' functioned as an ideal that summed up processes not entities. Processes of true communication were to be found fragmentarily in society--most consistently in the family. His problem was to liberate them to become forces in society--to rescue them from the privatized domain of the home. They needed a mechanism, an agency through which to exert their claims. The school, which was the locus of action for millions of female teachers, parent groups, mother's clubs, and community organizations, certainly had a chance, from the vantage point of the 1890's.

Dewey's hope for the advance of democratic values rested heavily on an almost acritical positive regard for communication. He insists that:

> . . . a subtle, delicate, vivid, and responsive art of communication must take possession of the physical machinery of transmission and circulation and breathes life into it. . . Then machinery will be a means of life and not its despotic master.[9]

Under such conditions democracy will come into its own, "for democracy is a name for a life of free and enriching communion." Thus, in Dewey we have a reformulation of the support for feelings and sentiment as powers capable of directing social progress. Through the proper conduct of the school they could become "conditions and forces of our community life."[10] His audacious move against the entrepreneurial spirit of his times was to take as primary public factors, qualities increasingly regarded as not only apolitical but effete. He took seriously the claims in which women had a basic interest and provided a secular mechanism for their expression. In so doing he severed the ideals of service and sentiment from those of submission.

> Our public education is the potential means for effecting the transfiguration of the mechanics of modern life into sentiment and imagination. . . We may never get beyond the mechanics. We may remain burly, merely vigorous, expending energy riotously in making money, seeking pleasure and winning temporary victories over one another. Even such an estate has a virility lacking to a culture whose . . . triumph is finding a place in refuge. But it is not enough to justify a democracy."[11]

The new social forces of modern life form masculine identities that are vigorous, competitive, greedy, energetic. Dewey grants these a fundamental place by locating them in the dynamism of modernity. Yet they must be "transfigured" by imagination and sentiment toward a democratic community.

On the subjective side, the potential of sentiment was argued in his moral theory. His contribution here lay especially in what he denied about the nature of morality. No domain of pure and transcendent morality exists since "the term 'moral' does not refer to a special region or portion of life."[12] No group has special virtues and hence no special political vocation. Rather, in Moral Principles in Education he defines moral force in the world as "efficiency in execution or overt action."[14] Liberated from constricting conditions personal qualities are released to operate as natural forces which must be reckoned with. The school's strategic position in the life of the individual and of the society permits it to develop efficiency in action as a constituent of character. Thus, personal qualities and shared values are treated by him as counter forces to privatism and egoism which can be built up and guided. The potential power of the school derives from its capacity to shape the desired social qualities--particularly serviceableness.

Through rendering social service the individual fulfills selfhood and enriches the community. Whereas domestic feminism appeals to the authority of spiritual transcendence, Dewey turns to psychological patterns as effective sources of reform. But in both cases notions of direct political confrontation are sidestepped. They are in effect, rendered irrelevant to "true" social reform. It would be easy to assume on a simplistic reading of Dewey that building "force of character" led directly to democratic conditions. Thereby eliminating the need for political confrontation. Nevertheless, by taking "domestic" virtues out of their assigned enclave, and placing them in the public institution of the school he degenderized them. The school for him, helped to bridge what was the deepest and most dangerous division of our life--that between the public and shared and the private and isolated. Education, he said, may lead the way in healing the breach only if it will "awaken to a sense of identity with the cause of community."[15]

The idea of freedom is central to an understanding of Dewey's linkage of the concepts of service and power here. In Experience and Education the argument on the issue of freedom and power runs as follows: Freedom lies in the power to:

> . . . frame purposes, to judge wisely, to evaluate desires by the consequences which will result from acting upon them, power to select and order means and to carry them out.[16]

Since freedom is the power ". . . to select and order means to carry chosen ends into operation," it refers to conditions of social and intellectual communication. Power is the social freedom to participate with others in determining the conditions under which one lives. For Dewey, the communication, mutuality, sharing, are not merely desirable in some nostalgic sense, they are the very conditions of the human power to act toward ends.

The familiar outcome of this, and all Deweyan conceptual analysis, is a harmonious circle of interlocking definitions. Common sense notions of power as coercion for example, or the use of 'force' as violently destructive, either never make an appearance or are rejected out of hand. Rather, unlike or opposed notions are rendered synonymous or tightly reciprocal. The common meanings in use are not so much denied as excluded. Freedom is a shared power to participate in choosing ends worthy of our service. It becomes an error on this formulation to attempt definition of power, or community, or service, in isolation. We have, instead, a concept attempting to capture the nature of a process-freedom/power. As an ideological position the intent is clear. Certain features of the modern personality are rejected as too one sided, i.e., egocentricity, self-serving competitiveness, coercive communication. The linking of notions of power and sharing pulls together what are commonly considered separated "realms" of experience. We are not used to thinking of power in this way. Through these concepts of process we are able to think not about those who serve or those who control, but about conditions under which we all have shared freedom/power to serve democratic change. This idiom was especially germane to the intellectual needs of women moving into public leadership positions. Their sense of identity as women excluded positive attitudes toward gaining their ends through directly applied force.

But there are logical problems with Dewey's synthesis. His often noted habit of speaking in what seems to be descriptive terms lends his prose an uncanny tone of authoritativeness. It is both beguiling and confusing. Once his system or stipulated definitions has been set out and accepted, their normative or formal nature is obscured. An encircled conceptual world is the outcome. Because of their particular social position at the turn of the century, it

was prose particularly attractive and familiar to women. In any case, coupled with the psychologising of political issues, the effect was to exclude from legitimacy educational change strategies using coercion and/or confrontation.

In the development of the public school through the twentieth century Dewey's language of moral reform was retained. This is hardly surprising since his thought, like that of domestic feminism, drew upon two centuries of evangelical rhetoric which had been so powerful in the socialization of American women. "Dewey substituted democracy for religion as the road to truth and freedom."[17] With so many women participating in the cause of public education it was perhaps inevitable that his thought became a conduit for older, more religious language which shared with his the confluence on descriptive and normative meaning.

In the conflict laden adjustment to the bureaucratic reforms of the twentieth century, professional teachers increasingly found themselves speaking two languages. As Hobson indicates:

> . . . professionals have spoken in the idiom of technical competence when promoting bureaucratic solutions to . . . issues, . . . or in terms of calling or service when resisting the claim of particular bureaucracies.

According to Hobson the content of the service ideal was deeply influenced by the fact that the majority of educational professionals were women. As he states, the claims of technical efficiency were received by them as intrusions on the autonomy of their work. Confronted with the reality of power, they protected the domain of autonomy dedicated to principles of service and open communication. In certain respects Deweyan thought encouraged the retreat, for he provided a theory that rejected the need for adversarial struggle. For most teachers, it was enough to work toward community and "force of character" as methods toward democratic change. Further, after World War I, ideas of efficiency became sharply divorced from notions of moral reform. Ironically, the effect was to make democratic ideals seem both worthwhile and ineffectual in organizing the school. A high-blown rhetoric still expressed the stated purpose of the school while obscuring or rejecting issues of power. The professional consensus was that education need not and should not be "political." Women in the classrooms found themselves in a new private domain.

An indication of this common sense assumption is found in the literature of organizational theory where it is argued that the dominance of female memberships in education has inhibited its full professional development.[19] Questions are raised about the viability of female attitudes, e.g., client-centeredness, dislike of confrontation, and low personal ambition. What were once considered positive virtures are now perceived as forms of docility or passivity. They are used to explain the alleged failure or women to achieve. Why haven't women attained power in their own profession? This short study suggests a different question. If there has been a failure in the level of female participation in the struggle for professional advancement, it may not lie with their retaining what are still perceived to be 'female' virtues. May it not lie instead with their failure to take responsibility for the stake they themselves had in maintaining a truly "public" public school? In short, was not the professional advancement of women in the field accompanied by a moral sectarianism which inhibited their participation in political criticism of education? A first theoretical step toward the full socialization of domestic virtue was made in Dewey's moral and educational thought, or the fuller participation of women in education leadership, Dewey's work with its powerful and yet ambiguous influence remains a largely unmined field. Dewey's questions still face the profession--How do qualities valued in the schoolhouse become "forces" in the world? The presence of women still dominates the school, particularly at the lower levels. And again the lines and values of women are changing. These conditions suggest that a great deal of theoretical work in the analysis of the educational thought of Dewey remains to be done from the standpoint of feminist studies.

FOOTNOTES

1. See Nancy Cott, "Young Women in the Second Great Awakening," Feminist Studies, 3 Fall, 1975, Barbara Welter, "The Cult of True Womanhood, 1820-1860," New England Quarterly, 18, 1966, Judith Montgomery, "The American Galatea," College English, May 1971.

2. Mary Hartman, Victorian Murderesses. (New York: Pocket Books - Simon & Schuster, 1977), p. 4.

3. Hartman, Murderesses, p. 5.

4. John Dewey, "What are Russian Schools Doing?" Vol. II of Character and Events. (New York: Henry Holt & Company), p. 409.

5. "Russian Schools"

6. John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems. (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1927), p. 150.

7. The Public, p. 126.

8. C. Wright Mills, Sociology and Pragmatism: The Higher Learning in America. (New York: Paine-Whitman Publishers, 1964).

9. Dewey, The Public and Its Problems, p. 184.

10. John Dewey, Moral Principles in Education. (New York: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1967), p. 58.

11. John Dewey, American Education and Culture, Vol. II of Characters and Events. (New York: Henry Holt and Company), pp. 502-503.

12. Dewey, Moral Principles, p. 50.

13. Moral Principles, p. 50.

14. Moral Principles, p. 49.

15. John Dewey, Experience and Education. (New York: The MacMillan Comapny, 1938), p. 64.

16. John Dewey and John Childs, "The Socio-Economic Conditions of Education," in The Educational Frontier, Wm. Kilpatrick (ed.). (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, Inc., 1935) p. 36.

17. William Brickman, "Dewey's Social and Political Commentary" in Guide to the Works of John Dewey, Jo Ann Boydston (ed). (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1970), p. 225.

18. Wayne Hobson, "Professionals, Progressives, and Bureaucratization," Historian, Vol. XXXIX, No. 4, August, 1977, pp. 651-652.

19. See James W. Grimm and Robert Sterm, "Sex Roles and Internal Labor Market Structures: The 'Female' Semi-Professions," Social Problems, 21, 1974.

JIM TEACHES FANG TO SIT

James F. Andris
Southern Illinois University
at Edwardsville

In this paper I intend to do the following things. I will present a description of someone teaching a dog a new trick. I will extract from that description some of the logical conditions for teaching. As these logical conditions are presented, I will relate them to some of the more important recent contributions to the philosophical analysis of teaching.

There have been several recent philosophical analyses of teaching which have shed considerable light on the nature of teaching (McClellan, 1976; Kerr and Soltis, 1974; Noddings, 1974; and Koh, 1976). However, most of these analyses do not illuminate the particular way in which teaching relates to learning. McClellan, who does focus on this problem, restricts his analysis to a particularly complicated form of human learning. One advantage of the analysis in this paper is that it assumes a particular theory of learning and shows how this theory of learning necessarily interacts with the beliefs and plans involved in teaching. In taking this step, I hope to have pointed the way to a more general analysis of teaching which distinguishes teaching from other intentional activities aimed at learning.

I.

Imagine Jim teaching Fang to sit. Jim can recognize a sitting dog. Jim wants Fang to sit when he says "Sit!" Jim has a plan for getting Fang to sit. He will get Fang in a room and wait until Fang sits. As Fang starts to sit, Jim will say "Sit!" If Fang sits, then Jim will say "Good dog!" or give him a biscuit. If Fang does not complete the sitting, then Jim will press Fang's hindquarters into a sit and reward him for the sitting. Jim intends to repeat this basic strategy, and he believes that eventually Fang will sit on command and not require a reward each time.

Now with this plan and set of beliefs, Jim takes Fang into the room. Fang is frisky and doesn't sit immediately. Jim decides to and does say "Sit!" while pressing Fang's hindquarters. He notices that he must remain menacingly present, finally secures a sit, and says "Good dog!" There are several

such action sequences with the same general format. After 15 minutes, Fang is sitting on command fairly regularly, with only an occasional reward. Fang has learned a new trick. And Jim has taught him.

Now consider the necessary$_0$ conditions implicit in such a description as the one above.

A. Cognizing conditions for teaching

A1 The teacher (T) has set of rules (R) to which the learner's behavior (B) is to conform (The content condition)

A2 T has a specific learner in mind (The individuation condition)

A3 T has a set of beliefs i) about B, ii) about T, iii) about the teaching environment (E), and iv) about how B, T, and E relate (The belief condition)

A4 T has a plan of action based on A1, A2, and A3 and for the sake of the specific actions B1, B2, and B3 (The planned interface)

B. Acting conditions for teaching

B1 T has a set of perceptions about the teaching situation (The watching condition)

B2 T chooses acts, based on A and B1, which he judges are appropriate (The evaluation condition)

B3 T acts based on B2 (The created interface--correcting, content displaying)

Space limitations prevent me from discussing the three conditions under B. However, in discussing the planned interface, A4, much that is relevant to the conditions under B will be considered.

II.

A1 The content condition. I have previously defined 'rule' as 'a way of behaving in certain kinds of circumstances.'[1] This is precisely what Jim has in mind for Fang, that Fang will sit (a way of behaving, W) when Jim says "Sit!" (a kind of circumstance, C). The sense in which I intend 'has a set of rules' is this: T can recognize the way of behaving in question and can recognize the kind of circumstance in question. Jim need not be able to state necessary and sufficient

conditions for sitting and for saying "Sit!," he need only be able to recognize sitting and saying "Sit!" when it occurs. Furthermore, T does not merely have the ability to recognize W and C as unrelated, but rather, T recognizes W and C as components in a rule. T in a broad sense requires this way of behaving of Fang in these circumstances.

The content condition[2] just explicated corresponds to the following fact about ordinary talk about teaching. If Jim tells me he has been teaching, and I ask him what he has been teaching, he must respond with some stated content to the teaching. If he says "Oh, nothing, I was just teaching," then we wonder if he knows what the word "teaching" means.

A2 The individuation condition. I tend to agree with McClellan:

> There are occasions when teaching is directed to groups: The coach is teaching the offense how to execute trap right . . . A team learns how to execute the play; the individual player learns how to execute the play; the individual player learns how to execute his particular movement, and, if the team is to win games, the individual player learns how to adjust his execution of his assignment in accordance with how others are executing theirs. And there is nothing left over. All teaching acts are analyzable without remainder into acts of teaching individuals.[3]

This individuation condition corresponds to the following linguistic situation. If Jim tells me he has been teaching, and I ask him who he has been teaching, it is not a meaningful linguistic option for Jim to say, "No one in particular; I was just whiling away some time teaching." To be sure, a particularly absent-minded professor might forget who he had been teaching, but the implication of a teaching claim is that there was at least one particular student involved. He might say "I don't remember," but not "No one."

A3 The belief conditions. To say that someone is teaching is to say that he has a certain set of beliefs about the learner, about himself, about the setting of the teaching, and about how he, the learner, and the teaching setting will interact. This is not the place to engage in a detailed analysis of belief, but some general comments are in order. Belief is essentially linguistic in character. It functions to express expected states of affairs. The general logical form of belief has been formalized as symbolic logic. The

content of belief is the expected state of affairs expressed by the particular belief. To be sure, a given existing state of belief in someone may not issue in statements which meet logical standards, but such statements must have linguistic characteristics to a significant degree.[4]

i Beliefs about the learner. Here is a somewhat novel way of characterizing the relationship between teaching and learning: the teacher has a theory of learning which he or she believes describes B's behavior. Any general analysis of teaching must give a general account of what it is for a teacher to have a theory of learning. In this paper, however, I am going to explicate what I take to be the common sense theory of learning implicit in the beginning example. There appear to be four assumptions implicit in the dog-teaching example, and which make up the implied learning theory held by the teacher.

BL1 Classical conditioning assumption. If condition, c_1, evokes behavior, b, and if condition, c_2, is presented simultaneously with c_1, then eventually c_2 will evoke b without the presence of c_1.

BL2 Operant conditioning assumption. If c does not evoke b, and if c precedes b followed by reward, r, then eventually c will evoke b without r.

BL3 Chaining assumption. If b_1 does not evoke b_2, and if b_1 precedes b_2 followed by r, then eventually b_1 will evoke b_2 without r.

BL4 Perception assumption. It is B's (the learner's) perception of conditions and rewards in the above three assumptions which brings about the required behaviors.

Despite the protestations of the rationality theorists,[5] we can and do speak clearly and correctly of teaching where the implied learning theory is as given above. The clarity arises from the common sense conception we have of teaching animals. I also believe that this minimal learning theory will describe at least a segment of the behavior of any creature to which a teaching act is directed. In the case of human behavior, however, a much more complex theory of learning is required for that behavior's complete and accurate characterization. In fact the theory of intention implicit in this analysis of teaching is probably required to explicate full human learning. But I shall not address that problem in this paper.[6]

ii Beliefs about the teacher. Kaufman (1966) analyzes

three knowledge situations out of the avowal of the form "I intend to do X." The first knowledge situation is analyzed from the "I" in the given statement: the agent knows who, where and what he is at some minimal level. In giving an analysis of teaching, I prefer to weaken these conditions to belief conditions: teachers do believe that they are such and such a person, that they do behave in certain ways in certain circumstances (and have done so in the past), and that they are at a certain place and time (BT1).

My reason for weakening Kaufman's condition from teacher self-knowledge to teacher self-concept is that it is still unclear to me whether knowledge implies truth. If that be the case, then a self-knowledge condition would rule out many examples of teaching, since teachers may be mistaken, especially in their self-concept. It is probably true, however, that some minimal amount of self-knowledge is required for any intentional activity. Just how much is required for the teaching act is not clear to me.

One belief about self which is particularly central to the analysis of teaching is the following: (BT2) teachers believe that what they are doing in a teaching act will cause the required rule-conforming behavior. Koh (1976) believes that "relevant causality" is a necessary condition of teaching. He says that he is unable to give a sufficiently clear analysis of relevant causality, however. He ends up by giving causality as one condition for successful teaching: "some actions in $_7$S (a system of actions) relevantly caused Paula to learn."[7] But we need not give an extensive analysis of 'cause' here to delineate the relevant sense of 'cause': teachers simply believe that without their intervention, the required learning would not have occurred, at least not at that place and time. If they believed otherwise, there would be no point to their activity. They believe in the effectiveness of their agency.

iii Beliefs about the environment. Just as with the learner and the teacher himself, the teacher has a theory which he believes describes the "behavior" of the environment. The minimal belief about the environment seems to be that it is stable in the following sense:

> BE1 Stability assumption. If c is an environmental condition for which a certain animal behavior, b, is required, then i) c will occur with enough frequency and regularity for b to be learned, and ii) c will not be attended by so many distracting conditions that b cannot be learned.

In order to get a more complete understanding of how teacher and environment interact, one would have to disinvolve the particular theory of environment held by the teacher in question.

Beliefs about the connection of A1, A2, and A3. In teaching Fang to sit, Jim sees no inconsistency between his teaching goal and the various theories he has about the learner, himself, and the environment. Now, Jim may not be very self-conscious about the fact that he does have theories of these components of the teaching situation. He probably has not made the distinction between empirical and logical possibility. But he does believe in the possibility if not the probability that the environment, the dog, and he can be shaped[8] to bring about the desired learning based on what he[9] (thinks he) knows about them and the way that they interact.

III.

In 1971 I wrote that one of the rules a teacher must be following is this one:

> The learner's behavior is to be corrected by X whenever it is judged by X that such correction may or will result in the desired behavior.[10]

This rule was subsequently dubbed the "watching and correcting" condition by Flew (1973). Koh (1976) has argued against both this condition and also Hirst's (1973) displaying content conditions as necessary conditions for teaching. In the following presentation I intend to show that both the watching and correcting condition and the displaying content condition are part of a more general necessary condition for teaching, namely, a plan of action for teaching.

A4 The planned interface condition. I want not to present a set of necessary conditions for a teaching plan of action, and then explicate these conditions. Such a plan of action is mirrored in the action phase of teaching, and teaching cannot be properly conceptualized without seeing its action phase as reflecting the cognitive operations explicated in this and the preceding section of this paper. A4 T has a plan of action based on A1, A2, and A3.

PG Teaching goal assumption. T wants learner, B, to exhibit behavior, b, whenever condition, c_1, is presented under normal conditions (c_1 may be teacher action, t)

PS Teaching setting. T plans to get B into conducive learning environment, E

PW Teaching watching assumption. T plans to watch B for signs of b, E for proper learning conditions, c, and himself, t, for proper teaching moves

PI Teacher planned interface assumption. T plans to present c_1 or to cause c_1 to occur when b is about to occur (Presenting tactic)

PC1 Teacher correcting assumption 1. T plans to reward B with condition, c_2 (which may also be teacher action, t) when c_1 is followed by b or to punish B with condition, c_3, when c_1 is not followed by b (Motivating tactic)

PC2 Teacher correcting assumption 2. T plans to, if necessary, manipulate the environment, producing condition, c_4, which brings about b (Formation tactic)

PE Teacher evaluation assumption. T plans to make appropriate choices of tactics, t, from PI, PC1, and PC2, basedon observations (PW)

In brief, the above necessary conditions for teaching plans involve not only watching (PW) and correcting (PC1 and PC2), but also interfacing (PI), creating a conducive setting (PS), and evaluating (PE). And all of these necessary conditions spell out what it is to plan to teach what it is that T wants B to learn (PG).

It should be noted here that Noddings (1974), in extending the model of Kerr and Soltis (1974), has discerned many of the general features of the analysis presented here. What is distinctive about the presented analysis, however, is that by conceptualizing the content to be taught as rules, and by assuming the specific learning theory, I am able to show precisely how the teaching goal relates (necessarily) to the several tactics of the planned teaching act. Also, while Noddings notes that the specific teaching goal may be modified by more general teacher goals and by the setting, my analysis does not attempt to account for this.

PG Teaching goal assumption. As Dewey (1939) pointed out, a person who wants something is committed to bringing that state of affairs about. To move from wishing to wanting involves a decision to seek out what it is that one prefers. Thus the content condition referred to earlier states that the teacher has a set of rules to which the learner's behavior is to conform. However, unless a person not only

sees this learner behavior as required (A1) but also wants the learner behavior in the above sense of 'want' (PG), that person is not teaching. The six remaining planning conditions spell out the specific way in which a teacher wants to bring about learning.

PS Teacher setting assumption. This condition is that the teacher plans to get the learner into a conducive learning environment. This is a logically necessary condition for teaching, since any learning theory specifies a relationship between learner and environment. However, not much of a specific nature can be said about the way that this assumption plays itself out in a particular teaching act until some further facts are known. These questions would have to be answered: what are the preceived laws governing the appearance of the desired learning conditions, and how does the teacher conceptualize the interaction between the environment, himself, and the learner?

PW Teacher watching assumption. The teacher must plan to get feedback on the teaching situation, and not merely second-hand reports, at that. Recall that the teacher does have a theory of learning, of his own behavior, and of the environment. At the very minimum, the intention to bring about learning must involve planning to look for signs of learning conditions in the actual teaching situation. Generally, what a teacher watches for is determined in part by the significant variables in his theoretical perspective of the teaching situation. It is determined in another part by the teacher's memory of what has transpired so far.

PI Teacher planned interface assumption. Hirst (1973) claims that

> in so far as one is necessarily teaching X, the specific activity involved must, . . . either implicitly or explicitly, express or embody the X to be learned, so that this X is clearly indicated to the pupil as what he is to learn.[11]

Hirst has assumed that teaching occurs in the context of intentional learning, and, of course, I have not made that assumption. Nevertheless, there is a generalization of Hirst's condition which applies to the teaching situation described initially in this paper. It is that the teacher intends to create an interface between the learner and the rule to be learned by juxtaposing (in the appropriate setting) the condition to be responded to with the desired response. And (on the teacher's learning theory) it is believed by T that

sufficient such juxtaposition, given B's perception of c and r, will lead to the required rule-conforming behavior. Now, on this account, the content to be learned (the rule the teacher has in mind) will be "expressed" in the teaching act at just those points where the teacher has managed to juxtapose c and b, the required condition and behavior.

Where intentional learning is assumed, the content to be taught may be even more explicitly expressed, in that the teacher may demonstrate the correct response to the required condition, and expect the learner to be able to differentiate the required condition and imitate the correct response. Indeed, this may be one of the characteristics of intentional learning, but this question is beyond the scope of this paper.

PC1 and PC2 Teacher correcting assumptions. The concept of 'correcting' is central to the explication of 'teaching' in its generic sense.[12] I intend 'correcting' as meaning "adjusting to an established standard." We cannot understand how teaching could occur where the person to be taught already has learned and retains the required behavior and the "teacher" believes this to be the case. The general assumption is that the teacher and not the learner holds the standard for what is to be learned.[13]

We equally can make no sense of a "teacher" who has decided to do nothing to adjust the learner's behavior to what is to be learned regardless of the course the learning takes. My earlier condition for teaching, that the teacher must be following the rule that the learner's behavior is to be corrected by X (the teacher) whenever it is judged by X that such correction may or will result in the desired behavior, this condition, I say, has been misunderstood, most recently by Koh (1976). Quoting a different section of my paper and then reacting to it, he says that

> There are at least some teaching episodes where no corrective moves are made, either because the teachers involved fail to make corrective moves, or because the learners are such excellent candidates that no corrective moves are necessary, at least during some teaching episodes.[14]

But how is this point a refutation of the stated condition? Certainly a given teacher might judge that the learner is doing well enough that corrective moves are not necessary. But what would we make of a teacher who, on perceiving that the learner was not doing as well as expected, still refused to make corrective moves? We would, I think, either expect the teacher to have some appropriate reason for failing to cor-

rect, or we would refuse to call his activity "teaching."

This leads to Koh's second criticism of the stated condition, which I contend is also a misunderstanding. Koh says

> the "must" in (the principle) is not a logical "must" but a prescriptive one, which is further reinforced by "is to be corrected by X." Hence, (the principle) no longer describes what teaching is, but instead it tells one what a teacher ought to do.[15]

This is simply not what I intended. I am not, as Koh later claims, attempting "to specify one single kind of action (underlining mine) as a necessary condition of teaching,"[16] at least not during any specific teaching episode, rather I am describing a rule which must be part of an intentionality for that intentionality to be correctly described by "teaching."

More specifically then, by using the very simple learning theory implicit in the beginning example, we can see that teacher intention takes at least two distinctive forms of planned correction. The first form of planned correction is based on the teacher's assumption that learning is an activity and is motivated by a seeking of positive stimuli and an avoidance of negative stimuli. There is an intention to shape behavior through reward and possibly punishment. The teacher, so to speak, intends to work with behaviors already in the repertoire of the learner by attempting to control the frequency and condition of their appearance by manipulated stimuli, of which his own actions may be an instance.

The second form of planned correction rests on the assumption of the shapeability of learner behavior. That is, the teacher believes that even though a desired behavior (or sequence of behaviors) may not be in the existing repertoire of the learner, still, the desired behavior may literally be formed by carefully controlling environmental conditions. And hence, the teacher intends to form behaviors when appropriate.

PE Teacher evaluation assumption. Flew (1973) makes the following claim:

> If . . . anyone is a genuine learner 'trying himself to master some piece of knowledge,' or an authentic teacher 'trying to bring it about that someone else masters such an item of possible knowledge,' then necessarily he must be concerned whether, how far, and how well he is succeeding. But he can scarcely

> claim to be this concerned if he takes no steps to discover the answers to these questions. And the most general word for all such attempts is--spare the mark--'assessment.' (p. 207)

Earlier in the paper I identified a teacher evaluation assumption, namely that T plans to make appropriate choices of tactics based on observation. What we have been able to discern from assuming our simple learning theory is that the choice of tactics is between creating an interface between rule and learner, rewarding (or punishing) the learner, and shaping the learner's behavior. By being this specific about the learning theory involved, we can see that choosing between tactics based on observation of the learning situation is tantamount to Flew's notion of assessment.

In the context of the teaching enterprise, the most salient sense of 'assessment' or 'evaluation' is just this kind of practical judgment about what needs to be done given the state of learning at hand. Of course, evaluation is frequently identified with the giving of marks which supposedly indicate the discrepancy between who is learning and what is to be learned. However, these "marks"--assessments--need not be given to the student, recorded in any file, or even written down or spoken. In fact, it is a matter for assessment whether they should be used at all in this fashion.

David Hofmann has suggested to me[17] that the certification function and the teaching function are often confused. This analysis allows us to clearly distinguish these two functions. In both cases a choice is involved. In certification the choice is of a symbol which represents the disparity between the learner and what is to be learned. In teaching the choice is between tactics. In the sphere of intentional teacher behavior, a choice of tactics signifies two things. It signifies a recognition of a certain disparity between what is being taught and the learner. It also signifies an intended decrease in this disparity. It is the latter logically necessary sense of 'assessment' or 'evaluation' which is implied by the concept of 'teaching.'

IV.

In conclusion I would like to summarize what has been accomplished by this paper. There is a common sense concept of teaching animals which, when explicated, implies that teaching (in this sense of 'teaching') is an intentional activity involving on the part of the teacher plans to bring about learning, a concept of the rules to be learned, and beliefs about the learning situation. Some specific beliefs are that the learning takes place through a process

involving behavior shaping and reward perceived by the learner and that the teacher holds his activities to bring about this learning. Finally, teaching plans involve wanting some rule to be learned. Specifically, the teacher plans to watch for signs of learning, create an interface between what is to be learned and learner behavior, correct (adjust) learner behavior through shaping and appropriate reward, and evaluate by choosing appropriate tactics in light of what is observed.

In disinvolving this basic concept of teaching, I realize I have not treated some of the most central aspects of teaching, and that in particular I have ignored teaching in the context of higher forms of human learning. To use McClellan's words, I have not addressed teaching in the context of active learning--"learning as something a person is doing (more or less deliberately)."[18] McClellan's (1976) extension of Komisar's (1968) work here is very significant, as are his comments on the concept of 'learning.'[19] However, I do not count my analysis as insignificant on this account, for much of the teaching that is done even with human beings does in fact meet this paradigm. It seems to me that a completely general philosophical analysis of teaching will make good sense of 'teaching' in both contexts. And further, I believe that such a general analysis of teaching must rest on an adequate conception of 'learning' taken as a form of rule-governed behavior.

FOOTNOTES

0. After having written this paper, I read Jonas Soltis' (1978) Analysis of 'teaching' in the second edition of An Introduction to the Analysis of Educational Concepts, pp. 69-77. He distinguishes several of the features of this analysis, and it is worth comparing the two. They are by no means identical, however. In particular, the nature of interfacing content and learner behavior stands out quite sharply in my analysis (for this assumed learning theory).

1. James F. Andris, "'Person X is Teaching'." Philosophy of Education, Proceedings of the Philosophy of Education Society, 1971, pp. 234-246.

2. It should be noted that my use of 'content' is not the same as McClellan's (1976). He says "(a way to put the content condition) is this: whatever one is doing in teaching must reveal what it is that one intends to teach." (p. 35) McClellan's content condition is a special case of what I call the "teacher planned interface condition." I take it to be more appropriate to reserve the label "content" for what is to be learned quite apart from its exhibition in the teaching activity itself.

3. James E. McClellan, Philosophy of Education, Prentice-Hall, 1976, pp. 30-31.

4. The significance of this point, as B. O. Smith, et. al. (1970) have pointed out, is that it is necessary to describe the linguistic characteristics of teachers in the complete scientific study of teaching.

5. For example, Martin (1970), Green (1971), and Komisar (1966) all argue against teaching as encompassing the sense I have explicated. My counter-arguments are presented in my dissertation: Teaching as Rule-Governed Behavior, Indiana University, 1974, pp. 72-78.

6. In my earlier writings on this subject (see footnotes 1 and 5) I distinguish between an intentional and a non-intentional sense of 'teaching.' I also argue that the only logically coherent approach to the use of 'teaching' is to restrict its meaning to the intentional sense. It is this sense which is explicated more fully in this paper.

7. Koh, Jolly Cheng-Whatt, "Jones is Teaching." Philosophy of Education, Proceedings of the Philosophy of Education Society, 1976, pp. 71-80.

8. Thomas Green, The Activities of Teaching, McGraw-Hill, 1971, has used the concept of 'shaping' in his analysis which relates teaching to training, conditioning, instructing, and indoctrinating. See p. 33.

9. Noddings (1976) offers a much more stringent condition of reasonableness for teaching than I do. In my opinion, she has given an excellent analysis of effective teaching (in the context of human learning). But we can and must speak of ineffective teachers. They won't disappear if we analyze them out of the concept of teaching.

10. Andris, 1971, op. cit., p. 236.

11. Paul H. Hirst, "What is Teaching?" in R. S. Peters, ed., The Philosophy of Education, Oxford University Press, 1973, p. 173.

12. See McClellan, op. cit., pp. 23-46, for an explication of this sense of 'teaching.'

13. Except for self-teaching, which is a different problem. I have treated this problem in my dissertation (Andris, 1974, op. cit., pp. 236-238). Space limitations do not permit laying out the arguments here. However, I arrived at the following important conclusion concerning the relationship of teaching to content: "any specific talk of teaching should always 1) specify the criteria for identification of the content of teaching (including whether or not it is to be identified independently of the teacher's conception, and 2) specify the degree of ability to identify the content on the part of the teacher in the case where the content is independently specifiable." (p. 238)

14. Koh, op. cit., p. 76.

15. Ibid., p. 76.

16. Ibid., p. 76.

17. In conversation about this paper.

18. McClellan, op. cit., p. 88.

19. Ibid., pp. 48-86.

THE INFLUENCE OF J. L. SPALDING'S EDUCATIONAL THEORY ON HIS THEOLOGY

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John Lancaster Spalding was the founder of the Catholic University of America. He also established one of the first central Catholic high schools in the United States. He authored eighteen books, most of them on education. William Torrey Harris called him "the most beloved of American educators." Nicholas Murray Butler gave him an honorary doctorate from Columbia. When Francis Wayland Parker died, Spalding was chosen, along with the city and county superintendents of Chicago and Cook County, to give the eulogistic remarks at the Chicago teachers' memorial service. When acrimonious comments were made about private schoolmen at NEA annual meetings, a specific exception was usually accorded "our own Bishop Spalding." How did this man, who began his career as the conservative bishop of Peoria in 1877, become the darling of American public schoolmen at the turn of the century? Basically, his educational philosophy was responsible. It changed him from a theological conservative into a theological liberal who was willing to accomodate with American secular concerns.

It will be the aim of this paper to trace the development of Spalding's theological thought from about 1880, when he first started to publish, to 1900, just after the condemnation of the Americanist heresy. This paper will also consider his educational theory, which remained constant during this period. Since his educational theory was more consonant with, and fundamental to, his later theological position than to his earlier theological one, the claim will be made that his educational theory was influential in the development of his theological thought and his later willingness to embrace the modern social order. The evidence will show that this claim is based on more than *post hoc ergo propter hoc* reasoning.

The standard used for comparison of Spalding's earlier with his later theological thought will be the errors condemned in the Apostolic Letter *Testem Benevolenciae* issued by Pope Leo XIII in 1899. The first part of this letter pointed out the general errors of the age, namely, that the Church should adapt itself to modern civilization and should exercise its authority with restraint. In the second part of

the letter, five specific errors were condemned. The five errors were: 1) all external guidance is to be rejected since the Holy Spirit gives greater gifts to the faithful now than in times past and an interior instinct moves them with no need for intermediaries; 2) the natural virtues are more in accord with the present day than the supernatural virtues; 3) the passive virtues are better suited to past times, while the active virtues are more suited to the present; 4) religious vows are out of keeping with the modern age since they restrict liberty, are more suited to weak minds than to strong ones and interfere with Christian perfection and the good of society; and 5) traditional convert-making methods should be abandoned and new methods should be utilized to convert non-Catholics.

With regard to his earlier theological thought, Spalding's position on the question of adapting the Church to the modern age was an ambivalent one. If it meant agreeing with the rationalistic spirit of the age, then the early Spalding opposed it.[1] If it meant giving up the traditional ties to the temporal State, then Spalding favored it.[2]

On the matter of stressing the authority and judgment of the Church, the early Spalding was a traditionalist. He feared that rejection of authority would entail rejection of dogma and consequently of religious truth.[3]

While it cannot be determined exactly what he thought about the distribution of the gifts of the Spirit, it does appear that the early Spalding would have been in accord with Testem Benevolenciae's insistence on the need for external direction. This is clear at least regarding his view of the relationships among the hierarchy and clergy.[4]

Regarding the error concerning the natural virtues as more in keeping with the needs of the present day, the early Spalding probably would have agreed with the condemnation. In 1878 he stated: "Men have grown accustomed to say, in this humanitarian and sentimental age, that naturally we love one another; and that with the progress of civilization we learn more and more to be tender and merciful to the wretched." Then, passing to the example of John Stuart Mill, Spalding said: "We find not in him the deep, and all-trusting love of a believing soul, for beings created in the image of God, but only a strong and fanatical attachment to his favorite theory for making a great many people happy."[5]

The early Spalding did hold, however, that the active virtues were more suited to the present day than the passive ones.

This is probably one of two condemned positions that Spalding held at this early period. In 1882 Spalding can already be found saying: "The Church must not stand far off, must not go into the desert, must not shut herself up in some sanctuary to weep and pray.[6] She must go into the midst of blood and uncleanness."

The early Spalding was back on the side of the letter with regard to its position on religious vows. In 1878 he spoke approvingly of the eighteen-hundred-year tradition of the consecrated life: "How many in lifelong self-immolation have found that with this love agony itself may become sweet and peaceful as the joy of heaven . . . In vain the worldling sneers and is incredulous . . . In some silent cloister, under some coarse garb, she will renounce wealth and pleasure and liberty, that she may live hidden with Christ in God."[7]

Spalding seemed to hold the fifth condemned position concerning convert-making at this early period. In 1879 he said: "Little as I am a Protestant, I infinitely prefer even the most extravagant Methodism to the indifference and atheism which, like a creeping paralysis, seem to threaten this whole modern world with despair and death. There are doubtless many persons who may still be helped by the old methods of controversy, but it remains none the less true that the great army of thinkers has left the old battlefields far behind. Other weapons are needed; other modes of defense - other modes of attack."[8]

Spalding's early theological thinking may thus be summarized by saying that he was generally opposed to excessive accomodation to the spirit of the age and hedging on dogma, that he favored the exercise of Church authority and thought that it was not being employed too excessively, that he favored external guidance in the direction of one's spiritual life, that the supernatural virtues were not to be neglected in favor of the natural ones, that the active virtues were more suited to present needs than the passive ones, that consecrated religious life was still of value and that new methods of attracting converts to the Catholic religion were needed. In the main, it seems he was orthodox in this early period.

Before proceeding to an analysis of Spalding's later theological thought, it will be helpful to give a brief statement of his early educational theory. It must be brief since his books on education were not published until the 1890s. However, at the close of a speech in 1879 dealing largely with theological themes, Spalding added a number of lines which summarize his educational thought. The lines are added rather gratuitously as a conclusion and have little inherent connection with anything he said in the speech. This was be-

cause at this early time his theological and educational thought were not yet integrated.

> We are busy discussing the question of education in a way which would imply that we imagine that man is wholly or chiefly educated in some school or college, when in point of fact the world is his university. The family educates, society educates, literature educates, science educates, commerce educates; and we shall have labored to small purpose in the best possible school-room if those who leave it are to plunge into an atmosphere in which the very breath of life is tainted. Man is God's appointed educator, and he works through class-book and drill, through poetry and eloquence, through art and science, through all the countless agencies which he makes a part of himself to shape the world to his will; and as the light of heaven throws its golden mantle of beauty over all things great and small, so should religious faith illumine all the ways of men that they may be seen to lead upward to peace and God. This, as I take it, was the thought of St. Ignatius when he gathered about him that immortal band, who, setting forth from Paris, the world's great culture-city, were to walk in all the ways of thought and action, until it should be shown that when they do not lose themselves in the abyss, they lead to Rome, the city of the soul. Now, as in his day, expedients are of little avail; men, rather than measures, are needed; for only a great soul can teach great thoughts and give the courage that makes them live. "Ah God, for a man with heart, head, hand, like some of the simple great ones gone. "[9]

The focal point for the study of Spalding's later theological thought on the matters dealt with in Testem Benevolenciae is a discourse which Spalding gave in the Jesuit Gesu church in Rome a year after the issuance of the apostolic letter. It was evident at the time that Spalding was registering a clear dissent from the letter's teaching in this discourse. This is shown by contemporary correspondence.[10] No implication is intended in the following analysis that Spalding's new theological positions were all arrived at simultaneously or that they were generated in direct reaction to the letter. Rather, Spalding's thought was in almost continuous process. The letter did, however, serve to call forth his response in the Gesu discourse of 1900.

In the pulpit of the Gesu church on March 21, 1900, Spalding swept away any doubts concerning the ambivalence of his position on the adaptation of the Church to the spirit

of the age. In 1880 he was willing to give up entangling concordats with secular states, but he was not willing to tamper with dogma. Now he had changed his mind:

> If we look upon theology as merely a system of crystallized formulas, as a science which need take no cognizance of the general culture of the age, content with presenting the old truths in the old way, as merely a larger catechism, with a more detailed exposition of definitions and refutations, we deprive it of power to influence men who are all alive with thoughts urgent as the growth of wings; who in the midst of problems which the new sciences raise and accentuate, have grown confused and begin to doubt whether human life shall not be emptied of its spiritual content. All knowledges are related, as all bodies attract and help to hold one another in place; and if we hope to commend and enforce revealed truth with effacacious power, we must be prepared to do so in the full blaze of the light which research and discovery have poured upon nature and the history of man. If, in consequence, we find it necessary to abandon positions which are no longer defensible, to assume new attitudes in the face of new conditions, we must remember that though the Church is a divine institution, it is none the less subject to the law which makes human things mutable, that though truth must remain the same, it is capable of receiving fresh illustration, and that if it is to be life-giving, it must be wrought anew into the constitution of each individual and of each age.[11]

Here Spalding was speaking of what Cardinal John Henry Newman, the English educator and theologian, called the development of doctrine. This kind of thought springs from an historical evolutionary sense and was quite in keeping with Spalding's earlier educational statement that "as the light of heaven throws its golden mantle of beauty over all things great and small, so should religious faith illumine all the ways of man that they may be seen to lead upward to peace and God."[12] Speaking to the National Education Association in 1901, Spalding was still phrasing this notion of the unity of truth from an educational point of view in much the same words that he used in 1879:

> Faith in the goodness of life, issuing in ceaseless efforts to develop it to higher and higher potencies, has determined our world-view and brought us to understand that the universe is a system of forces whose end is the education of souls; that the drama

> enacted throughout the whole earth and all the ages has for its central idea and guiding motive the progressive spiritual culture of mankind, which is the will of God as revealed in the conduct and teaching of Christ.[13]

Spalding had also changed his mind by 1900 on the matter of stressing Church authority. Not only was he advocating in 1900 that the clergy should gain respect by their own merits rather than by stressing their authority, but he was urging that the higher levels of the Church should not inhibit the necessary freedom of its lower-placed members:

> Does not all history prove that right human life is possible only when men are self-active in a free and noble way, when they strive bravely for more real knowledge and greater virtue? Where we strive there is indeed danger of error and mistake; but where we rest in spiritual lethargy, decay and ruin are inevitable. . . Opinion rules men, and opinion is nourished by beliefs, and beliefs are created and sustained by ideas. If we permit ourselves to fall out of the intellectual movement of the age, we shall lose influence over the minds that create opinion and shape the future.[14]

Spalding went on to point out that recent progress in natural knowledge had created a new world-view and so "if our words are to awaken a response, we must be able to place ourselves at the standpoint of our hearers. . . This ability is precisely what the best education confers; for it renders the mind open, luminous, fair, supple and manysided."[15]

At the 1901 National Education Association meeting he took the occasion to spell out the educational underpinning of this position:

> Education being a process of conscious evolution, they who assist and guide it must themselves continue to grow. The teacher's culture must broaden and deepen as knowledge increases. The more progress is made the more difficult his task becomes. It is easier to train to obedience than to educate for freedom. This, however, is the only true education; for authority rests on liberty, and its chief end is to secure and enlarge the rights and opportunities which none but beings endowed with freedom can possess. To educate to the freedom which is truth it is not enough to strengthen and fill the memory, to discipline the practical understanding, or to accustom to observances; one must

> quicken the whole man, must raise and purify the imagination, the heart, and the conscience.[16]

On the question of the distribution of the gifts of the Holy Spirit, Spalding gave no more hint of his feelings in 1900 than he did in 1880. However, in 1900 he seemed less inclined to favor the absolute need for external direction concerning these gifts. He says: "God is present in the innermost part of our being. . . Thus it (the soul) is an independent world, a kingdom in itself, able to endure and remain the same in the midst of an order of things that is forever changing and passing away."[17]

Spalding's position on this matter is in accord with his statement of educational theory in 1897, which is no more than an explication of his earlier educational thought of 1879, especially its emphasis on making things part of one's self so as to shape the world to one's will. Writing on "The Teacher and the School" in 1897, Spalding averred that becoming God-like was becoming self-active in the service of truth, beauty and goodness. Spalding concluded that "it is by rousing us to self-activity that God and nature work upon us, and it is by doing this that the teacher educates."[18]

Concerning the second formal error condemned in the letter, Spalding took a cue from the letter's denial of a distinction between the passive and active virtues and, instead, himself denied the distinction between the natural and supernatural virtues:

> Nature and the supernatural both come from Him; and in wider and deeper knowledge, we shall find a foundation for a mightier and more spiritual faith in the Eternal Father and His divine Son. Truth cannot contradict truth; for truth is true because it is enrooted in God, who is absolute truth and at one with Himself. Things are what they are, and God has given us reason, that we may see them as they are. The false can never be proven to be true, and the Author of truth cannot teach error or give grace to believe error. All truth is orthodox, whether it come to us through revelation, reaffirmed by the voice of the Church, or whether it come in the form of certain and scientific knowledge. Both the Church and the men of science must accept the validity of reason, and must therefore hold that reason cannot contradict itself. Knowledge and faith both do God's work, both help to build man's being into ever-increasing likeness to Him. Let us not emphasize the opposition between the temporal and the eternal. God is even here, and even

> now we are immortal; and whatever helps us to do His will by serving more effectively our fellow-men, is sacred and of priceless worth. The giving of a cup of water in the right spirit is divine service; and so is the patient service which leads to a knowledge of the causes of suffering and disease, and thereby enables us to shut out pestilence or to make uninhabitable regions wholesome.[19]

This position seems to be an outgrowth of Spalding's 1879 educational theory that "Man is God's appointed educator."[20] This was also spelled out in an address he delivered in 1899 wherein, speaking of the lowering of national life which would result if its top hundred minds were to be removed, he said: "This is also true of the Church, for in the supernatural as in the natural, God works through agents; and the radical blunder is to imagine that He will do immediately what He has made us capable of doing for ourselves."[21]

It has already been pointed out that Spalding had long disbelieved in the primacy of the passive over the active virtues. He does not mention this explicitly in the Gesu discourse, but hints at it there in his advice to youth: "We must indeed warn them against pride and conceit and halfness and dilettantism, against irreverence and knowingness; but it were a fatal mistake to imagine that we can do ought but harm by seeking to inspire them with a distrust of science and culture, or with a dread of the influence of such things on religious faith."[22] A couple of years prior to this, Spalding had written to Father Daniel Hudson at Notre Dame concerning a decision from Rome that would forbid the Brothers of the Christian Schools to teach the classics, which contained emphasis on the natural virtues: "This is a severe blow at our educational interests. Can you suggest anything which may help us to have this decision reversed? The devil is most dangerous when he assumes the garb of humility and piety."[23]

A couple of years after the Gesu speech, Spalding addressed the matter more explicitly, saying:

> Resignation is a virtue which religion and philosophy alike inculcate; but there is need for watchfulness lest it degenerate into indifference, sloth, negligence, and insensibility; and this danger hides also in humility, obedience, and patience - in all the passive virtues, which if cultivated overmuch beget an indolent and sluggish temper that is easily mistaken for piety. Virtue is essentially strength; and strength becomes weakness unless it exercise itself."[24]

This favoring of the active virtues and wariness of the passive ones is evident throughout all of Spalding's writings. That this position was tied to his basic dynamic educational philosophy seems sufficiently evident.[25]

The fourth point that the letter condemned was that vows were no longer appropriate to present day needs. Spalding was in agreement with the letter's sentiments in 1878, but by 1900 he was not. Speaking of the priest's role, he said in the Gesu discourse: "He may not confine himself within monastic walls, may not rest content with a culture and discipline that are merely theologic and ascetic: he must go forth into the great world as a guide and leader. . . ."[26] Surely this position seems to be more in accord with his original holistic educational theory than his former theological position which supported the sheltered religious life.

The final error condemned in the letter was that former methods of dealing with non-Catholics will not suffice and that new ones were needed. As noted above, Spalding had early advocated this condemned position. In his Gesu discourse he reiterated his dissent: "The new times demand new men; the ancient faith, if it is to be held vitally, must be commended with fresh vigor and defended with all the arguments which the best philosophy, science, and literature suggest."[27] This is simply a restatement in apologetic terms of Spalding's original educational theory which was open to the discoveries of the modern world.[28]

By 1900, Spalding held all of the errors which Testem Benevolenciae condemned. Moreover, Spalding had reversed his theological position over a period of twenty years on five of the seven matters discussed in the letter. In his early years, Spalding had been basically a conservative Romanist in theology; by 1900, he was a liberal Americanist.

It is difficult to determine what the direct causes of the change in Spalding's theological position were. A number of possibilities present themselves: the result of Spalding's experience in American ecclesiastical leadership, his association with pragmatic American secular leaders and his contact with European liberal theologians. Although some might wish to seek an explanation in his participation in the Americanist events of the 1890s, it is well to remember that Spalding did not participate in a consistent way in these events. When he was involved, it was not always on the side of the Americanists.

Whatever the assignation of causality for the change in Spalding, it seems clear from the analysis presented above that the progressive elements in Spalding's educational views

were at least an underlying influence in that change. All of Spalding's theological positions in dissent from Testem Benevolenciae were supported by his educational theory, and, while his theology had radically changed on many points over the years, his educational theory remained essentially the same. Thus, it is not surprising to find Spalding describe education as the basis of religion: "Is not religion itself a kind of celestial education, which trains the soul to god-like life? . . . To pray is to think, to attend, to hold the mind lovingly to its object; and this is what we do when we study. Hence prayer, which is the voice of religion, is part of education. . . What is the pulpit but the holiest teacher's chair that has been placed upon the earth?"[29]

Thus it was, that, influenced by his underlying educational theory, Spalding changed over a twenty year period from an orthodox conservative theologian into an Americanist "heretic." This influence of his educational theory on his theological development would seem to confirm the old axiom that, as grace builds on nature, so theology builds on philosophy.

FOOTNOTES

1. Walter J. Hill, S. J., Historical Sketch of the St. Louis University: The Celebration of Its Fiftieth Anniversary. (St. Louis: Patrick Fox, Publisher, 1879), p. 191.

2. John Lancaster Spalding, The Religious Mission of the Irish People. (New York: Christian Press Association, 1880), pp. 27-31.

3. Hill, Historical Sketch, p. 187.

4. Spalding, The Religious Mission of the Irish People, p. 27.

5. The Catholic Universe, Cleveland, Ohio, October 3, 1878. Copy in Archives of the University of Notre Dame.

6. John Lancaster Spalding, Lectures and Discourses. (New York: Catholic Publication Society, 1882), p. 298.

7. The Catholic University, Cleveland, Ohio, October 3, 1878.

8. Hill, Historical Sketch, p. 193.

9. Hill, Historical Sketch, pp. 197-198.

10. David Francis Sweeney, The Life of John Lancaster Spalding. (New York: Herder and Herder, 1965), p. 273. Archives of the University of Notre Dame, Klein papers, Denis O'Connell to Felix Klein, Rome, April 19, 1900; also, Hudson papers, Charles Starbuck to Daniel Hudson, Andover, Massachusetts, October 27, 1900.

11. John Lancaster Spalding, Religion, Agnosticism and Education. (Chicago: A. C. McClurg and Co., 1902), p. 177. (This book will hereafter be cited as RAE).

12. Hill, Historical Sketch, pp. 197-198.

13. RAE, p. 209.

14. RAE, p. 161-162.

15. RAE, p. 162.

16. RAE, pp. 214-215.

17. RAE, p. 168.

18. John Lancaster Spalding, Thoughts and Theories of Life and Education. (Chicago: A.C. McClurg and Co., 1897), pp. 210-211.

19. RAE, pp. 156-157.

20. Hill, Historical Sketch, pp. 197-198.

21. John Lancaster Spalding, Opportunity and Other Essays. (Chicago: A. C. McClurg and Co., 1900), p. 61.

22. RAE, p. 176.

23. Archives of the University of Notre Dame, Hudson papers, J. L. Spalding to Daniel Hudson, Peoria, November 4, 1898.

24. John Lancaster Spalding, Glimpses of Truth. (Chicago: A. C. McClurg and Co., 1903), p. 80.

25. Hill, Historical Sketch, pp. 197-198.

26. RAE, p. 187.

27. RAE, p. 164.

28. Hill, Historical Sketch, pp. 197-198.

29. John Lancaster Spalding, Means and Ends of Education. (Chicago: A. C. McClurg and Co., 1895), pp. 185-186.

INTERMEDIATE BETWEEN CLINKING AND RINGING: THE JINGLE-JANGLE FALLACIES

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Scholarly allusions over time thicken to an alarming degree. We are not surprised that scholars depend on their predecessors and colleagues, but we are surprised that these references can form chains generations long. Now, if scholars were drudges, we would expect a somewhat mechanical but accurate dredging up of and use of the past. Scholars, however, are frequently creative and ingenious. (Sometimes they are even fallible.) Because they are creative, the original thrust of a remark or distinction may be deflected to new purposes, and in the process of transmission its meaning may be changed. Since scholars are sometimes narrow but ingenious men, they frequently find that it is easier to transmute materials already at hand than to invent something new or to dig more thoroughly in the past for the precise thing they need. Accommodation of an earlier text to a new purpose is not confined to the Bible.[1]

A recent case in point, one of special interest to educators, is Michael Scriven's fifth-hand use of a quotation from "Professor Aikins." Scriven is quoting Donald Ross Green, who is quoting Truman Kelley, who is quoting Edward L. Thorndike, who is quoting "Professor Aikins." The case is timely, the point at issue is the much disputed distinction between aptitude and achievement. Before the chain of references extends many more generations on such an important topic, it may be helpful if we locate the meaning of each of them as accurately as possible.

Scriven picks up a quotation from Kelley which he found in Green's article. The quotation follows:

> The glibness with which we differentiate between achievement and intelligence is explained in part by the fact that our language is at fault. To use an illustration given by Thorndike (1904, p. 14), the expression 'college student' found so frequently in general discussions covers a multitude of classes: male and female; part time, full time; extension students and those in residence; native, foreign; lower classmen, upper classmen, graduates; etc. In each connection the expression 'college student' sounds the same, and

> thus we come to treat it as a single concept. Dr. Thorndike quotes Professor Aikins as describing this as the "jingle" fallacy because there is merely a verbal resemblance and no sufficient underlying factual similarity between the classes.[2]

A few minutes in a library suffice to trace down the allusion Thorndike makes to Professor Aikins. Herbert Austin Aikins (1867-1937) was the Leffingwell Professor of Philosophy in the College for Women of Western Reserve University. In addition to a volume he edited on David Hume, Aikins wrote The Principles of Logic,[3] which proved popular enough to require a second and revised edition a few years later. Chapter 18 is entitled, "Blunders in Word and Blunders in Thought." In one sense, the chapter is concerned with formal and material fallacies (fallaciae in dictione and fallaciae extra dictionem or in re). But, while he rejects the distinction between the forms of thought and the things thought about, Aikins willingly concedes that blunders are sometimes made because misconceptions arise, now about "the 'matter' under discussion," then from "the 'form' of words used in discussing it." Thus, some can be called extra-logical fallacies; others, logical fallacies. With other logicians, Aikins divides logical fallacies into the purely logical, "'where the fallaciousness is apparent from the mere form of expression'", and the semi-logical, "where the fallaciousness. . . is due to some ambiguity in the language used or some misunderstanding as to its meaning."[4]

"Jingle Fallacies" (or "Reflex Fallacies") is Aikins' name for purely logical fallacies. Any blunder that involves breaking one of the rules of inference is a jingle fallacy. Jingle fallacies include, therefore, affirming the antecedent on the basis of affirming the consequent, converting an A proposition simply, and inferring the falsity of a conclusion from the falsity of its premises. Aikins is not so much interested in addressing himself to the question why this or that inference is indeed fallacious. He is, rather, interested in why the blunder is committed, indeed why it is committed so commonly. Herein follows his explanation:

> If the reader will ask the following questions to some unsuspecting person and does not allow very much time to elapse between answering of one and the asking of the next, the result of the experiment may help to make the matter clear:
> Who was the first man?

Who was the first woman?
Who killed Cain?
Abel did not kill Cain, but his name will usually be mentioned, or at least come to mind, merely because it comes naturally at the end of the series 'Adam, Eve, Cain' and fits into the atmosphere of murder. It is largely a mere matter of the verbal jingle, the answer resulting from the same law of habit in the nervous system that accounts for putting one's pen in the paste-pot after using the brush. Most of these so-called purely logical fallacies come in precisely the same way. Inference is in the air and the jingle seems to fit, so we spurt out something when the premises will not justify any inference whatsoever, or an 'All' or a 'No' that fits the jingle when the premises justify only a 'Some'. If we say:

All X is Y;
All Y is Z;
All X is Z,

the reasoning is valid, but if we say:

No X is Y;
No Y is Z;
No X is Z;

or

No X is Y;
All Y is Z;
No X is Z,

it is not valid though we have merely substituted 'No' for 'All' or 'No X' for 'All X' throughout, without affecting the jingle. Indeed if we had only said 'No-X' instead of 'No X' the reasoning in the last case would have been precisely similar to that in the first and just as valid. Again if we say

Five francs are a dollar;
Four shillings are a dollar;
Five francs are four shillings,

the inference is perfectly valid; but if we say in precisely similar form

Blades of grass are green;
Frogs are green;
Blades of grass are frogs,

the inference is not valid. The reason is, of course, that the copula 'are' is used in different senses

> in the two arguments; but when we do not stop to think of the sense, the familiar jingle, assisted perhaps in this case by some recollection of Euclid's axiom that 'things equal to the same thing are equal to each other', lures us on to danger.
>
> In spite of a real confusion of meaning sometimes associated with some of these 'purely logical fallacies', they can hardly be called the result of thinking at all, but only of a reflex act. On this account it might have been more appropriate to call them the Reflex Fallacies or the Jingle Fallacies.[5]

A few comments are in order. Aikins is treating material that logicians have traditionally treated under "formal fallacies." These include "improper conversions" and "the fallacies of the undistributed middle and the illicit process of major or minor; and their equivalents in the hypothetical syllogism--the fallacies of affirming the consequent and denying the antecedent."[6] The money example is, however, either invalid (though conceivably true) or valid but tainted with the blunder categorized as "semi-logical," the fallacy of equivocation; for "is" is being used equivocally--as sign of identity rather than in its more ordinary use as copula.

There are other difficulties with Aikins' expositions. The Adam and Eve example is, at best, remotely connected with purely logical fallacies. The mistake occurs not because the form of the argument is mistaken for a valid form, indeed no argument is presented, but rather because the person questioned, associating four names, replies with the fourth, inappropriate as it is, after the other three have been mentioned. The mistake made is similar to that made by schoolchildren who reply "two-thirds" when asked: "You take away a third of a pie; how much do you have?" The form of the question induces an unthinking use of subtraction. So the name "reflex fallacy" is not inappropriate nor is "jingle fallacy" in the sense that the arrangement of words induces a pleasing effect ("Oh! this is easy; I just have to subtract 1/3 from one") without regard to the sense of the words. It is probably true that the reply given has been psychologically induced by the form of the preliminaries, but that form is in neither case one mistaken for a logical form, such as Barbara. Aikins' next cases, however, are examples of syllogisms mistaken for syllogisms in Barbara although they are rather E-E-E or E-A-E. And his last is an example of an undistributed middle.

What is perfectly obvious is that Aikins means by jingle

fallacy any mistake in thinking that is induced by getting someone to act unthinkingly or by reflex. The "yes phenomenon" in which a person is induced to say "yes" by first asking him several questions to which the obvious and easy answer is "yes" admits of either valid or fallacious conclusions and fits Aikins' description quite closely.[7] Aikins' jingle fallacy is, at once, narrower and broader than the matter included under logical fallacy. It excludes honest mistakes, mistakes made after conscious deliberation, on the one hand, and on the other includes mistakes brought about by confusions about the meaning of words (semi-logical fallacies) and mistakes that do not involve demonstration at all.

E. L. Thorndike (1874-1949), who had once been a colleague of Aikins at Wstern Reserve and had co-authored an article with him, is concerned with the misuse of units and scale in measurement. Numerical grades are notoriously subjective. One teacher's 95 may mean much more than another teacher's 95. It is very difficult to measure the difficulty of one arithmetic problem against that of another. These are subjective difficulties. Other errors arise through carelessness. College registrars count the number of students registered. Unless they are careful, they will equate a part-time with a full-time student. Since the same word, "student," is used, it is easy to make such a mistake. It is equally easy to assume that the first five steps in learning a skill are no harder or easier than steps 200 to 205. When people use the same word, they tend to think the word is being used univocally. And this is "what Professor Aikins had called the 'jingle' fallacy."[8] Clearly Thorndike's examples do fit under Aikins' commodious rubric, but they are not examples of a purely logical fallacy. They are examples of equivocation, one of the semi-logical fallacies. Henceforward, it will be Thorndike's examples and narrow use of Aikins that will be picked up by Kelley et al. Aikins' jingle fallacy will be equated to equivocation.

One of the examples Thorndike uses is the measurement of intellectual ability and achievement by "marks on an arbitrary scale."[9] Possibly for this reason, Truman Lee Kelley (1884-1961), who had been a student of Thorndike at Columbia University, picks up Thorndike's illustrations of the jingle fallacy. He uses Thorndike accurately, but he is really interested in a related but different problem. Thorndike focusses on equivocation, one word with several meanings. Kelley focusses on the problem of two words, achievement and intelligence, treated naturally enough as if they refer to two different things although the evidence points to their

referring in the main to the same thing. For this phenomenon Kelley uses the phrase, "jangle fallacy." "'Achievement' and 'intelligence' sound as though they were different; they have different 'jangles,' and thus we treat them as though they were different in truth."[10]

The jangle fallacy reverses Thorndike's jingle fallacy. Instead of one word with many meanings, there are several words with identical meanings. In the language of tradition, a "jangle" is a "distinction with a difference."[11] What makes Kelley's use less than satisfactory is that he believes there is some difference between intelligence and achievement. What he is trying to bring to his readers' attention is that 90% of their meaning-content is identical. For the logician, 90% is hardly enough to qualify for synonymity; for the pragmatist, however, it may be enough. "This means that a scant one-tenth of the tests are involved in the measure of difference and, practically, that judgments of individual differences between intelligence and achievement based upon the commonly available tests are quite unsound."[12]

Donald Ross Green, one of the planners of the conference on the aptitude-achievement distinction, uses quotations from Kelley to help set the tone and the state of the question for the conference. His use of Kelley is scrupulously accurate. Plainly, though, his hope is that the conference speakers will re-instate the distinction, still held by ordinary people, in such a way that scholars will again find it reputable. In other words, he is hoping that aptitude and achievement are not examples of the jangle fallacy.

> If he (Kelley) was right, it (the identity of aptitude and achievement) is indeed something to get excited about. He was apparently the first to explore the topic and his views have been accepted by many, but apparently without conviction since they have taken little action. Perhaps this is because although his data appear convincing and have been replicated over and over again, most people still really believe in the distinction. Who wants to act in opposition to all available evidence? What do you do if these two conflict and you claim to be a scientist? The answer is simple, you do nothing. You assert the evidence but without conviction and your students by the thousands go away believing as they did before and as you do in your heart.[13]

Green successfully avoids the difficulty which labeling introduces into a discussion by carefully using ordinary lan-

guage. But his use of "really believe" and his opposition of "asserting the evidence but without conviction" to "believing . . . in your heart," place him only inches away from Newman's notional and real assent[14] or from Hume's simple conception of and belief in the existence of an object.[15] A good reason for not using either of them is that Green is interested in turning a notional assent not into a real assent but, rather, into a real dissent; in turning a simple conceptual distinction that is merely entertained into a belief in the existence of a distinction between aptitude and achievement.

Scriven employs the jingle-jangle distinction in a new context. He concedes that "achievement" and "aptitude" are highly correlated. If they were intervening variables, then they would be virtually indistinguishable. But if they are theoretical constructs, as Scriven contends, then they are distinguishable because they have different meanings.[16]

By the use of this distinction, Scriven undercuts Kelley's use of the jangle fallacy: the two different words stand for two different though related sets of meanings. But Scriven is also intent on criticizing Thorndike's use of "college student" as an example of the jingle fallacy. Ordinary language is not at fault; for in any language a word may frequently be used quite different senses. There is a "natural assumption" that a word always means the same thing, but language does not bind itself to this assumption.

What is interesting here is that Scriven has fallen back on Aikins' original explanation of the jingle fallacy in terms of psychological tendency. And in his espousal of a context-dependent use of a word, he has cut through the distinction Kelley introduced between jingle and jangle. Words do not sound except in resonance with their surroundings. What in one context is seen as aptitude in another context is seen as achievement. And what words by convention signify is grounded in evidence that is independent of the theoretical constructs used to point to that evidence or infer it. Quite suddenly, the theoretical background has shifted from a psychological and logical one to an epistemological battleground where the contending flags of conventionalism and realism, Kuhnianism and empiricism are raised.

In seventy years, a term coined by a philosopher-psychologist is adopted and adapted by four later scholars, each finding it of use just so long as it is somewhat changed. Never quite on target, never quite off the mark, it is indeed a jingle, intermediate between clinking and ringing.

FOOTNOTES

1. See C. S. Peirce, Collected Works, and Leon J. Goldstein, Historical Knowing. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1976, pp. 140-141.

2. Involved in this quotation are the following sources: Michael Scriven, "The Logic of the Aptitude-Achievement Distinction," in Donald Ross Green (Ed.), The Aptitude-Achievement Distinction. Proceedings of the Second CTB/McGraw-Hill Conference on Issues in Educational Measurement. Monterey: CTB/McGraw-Hill, 1974, p. 329; Donald Ross Green, "Nebuchadnezzar Had Had a Dream. . . . .," Ibid., pp. 4-5; Truman Kelley, The Interpretation of Educational Measurements Mental and Social Measurements. New York: Teachers College Press, 1904, p. 14.

3. Herbert Austin Aikins, The Principles of Logic. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1902.

4. Ibid., pp. 191-192.

5. Ibid., pp. 193-194.

6. Joseph Gerard Brennan, A Handbook of Logic[2]. New York: Harper & Row, 1961, pp. 208-209.

7. See Wayne C. Minnick, The Art of Persuasion[2]. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1968, pp. 172-173 for a standard exposition of the "yes, yes method." Minnick gives an interesting quotation from Henry Ward Beecher's 1872 Yale Lectures on Preaching. Illustrating Beecher's use of the method. I am grateful to Elaine G. Bruggemeier for this reference.

8. E. L. Thorndike, Mental and Social Measurements, p. 10.

9. Ibid., p. 7.

10. Truman Lee Kelley, The Interpretation of Educational Measurements, p. 64.

11. The medieval counterpart of "distinction without a difference" in Ockham's "Magis est difficultas vocalis quam realis." See Leon Baudry, Lexique Philosophique de Guillaume d'Ockham. Etude des Notions Fondamentales. Paris: P. Lethielleux, 1958, p. 229. Scriven also alludes to this distinction; see Scriven, ibid., p. 332.

12. Kelley, ibid., pp. 21-22.

13. Green, ibid., p. 5.

14. See John Henry Cardinal Newman, An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1947, pp. 29-74. For a brief explanation, see Dr. Zeno, Our Way to Certitude. An Introduction to Newman's Psychological Discovery: The Illative Sense, and His Grammar of Assent. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1957, pp. 125-131.

15. See David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Book 1, Part 3, Section 7. But see also Michael Hodges and John Lachs, "Hume on Belief," Review of Metaphysics, 30 (September, 1976), p. 3-18.

16. On the distinction between intervening variable and theoretical (hypothetical) constructs, see Kenneth MacCorquodale and Paul E. Meehl, "Hypothetical Constructs and Intervening Variables," Psychological Review, 55 (1948), pp. 95-107. See also Merle B. Turner, Philosophy and the Science of Behavior. New York: Appleton-Century Crofts, 1967.

KARL MARX'S PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION: A RECONSTRUCTION OF MARX'S IDEAS ON EDUCATION

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Introduction and Description of the Study

At the last Annual Meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society, Professor Arturo Pacheco invited the membership to reconsider the importance of Karl Marx's work to current discussions in the philosophy of education. I am in agreement with Dr. Pacheco's assessment of the value of such a study; and, in accord with his advocacy, I would like to take this opportunity to share with the membership some of the findings of my recently completed dissertation, entitled "Karl Marx's Philosophy of Education: A Reconstruction of Marx's Ideas on Education."[1]

The primary purpose of the research was to find out what Marx said specifically about education and, further, at attempt a reconstruction of his philosophy of education. The specific objectives of the study were as follows:

1) the documentation, textual commentary, and analysis of Marx's explicit comments and writings on education;

2) the systematic examination of the underlying philosophical basis of Marx's educational doctrine; and,

3) the reconstruction of his philosophy of education.

To accomplish these objectives an historical methodology was utilized in the textual analysis of Marx's work. The research was divided into four biographical periods. The first, from 1818 to 1842, focused upon Marx's early life and educational experiences. The second period, 1842-44, included the correspondence and published essays associated with Marx's early career in journalism. During this time his ideas on education appeared in the polemical context of articles on religion and politics. The third period, 1844-1948, marked the beginning of Marx's analysis of political economy and the development of the materialist conception of history; included in this period were the philosophical and theoretical premises of his educational doctrine. In the last period of the study, from 1848 until his death in 1883, Marx was active politically

organizing the international working classes. It was in this political context that Marx posited his specific suggestions for communist education, referred to in the study as his "explicit doctrine on education."

Summary of Findings

Marx's Early Life and Educational Experiences

Karl Marx was born in 1818 in Trier, Germany. At the turn of the century, Germany was politically unstable. The Rhineland had been annexed by France during the Napleonic Wars and incorporated into the Prussian empire in 1814. With the politically tense atmosphere under Prussian rule and the growing disparity between the rich authorities and poor farmers, there was a growing interest in the ideas of the French utopian socialists.[2] Young Marx was certainly affected by this political and intellectual environment.

Marx's family was middle class and of Jewish ancestry. His father was a prominent lawyer in Trier and served as an official of the Royal Court. Marx was educated at home until the age of twelve, and, therefore, heavily influenced by his father, whom he loved and respected very much. His father subscribed to the philosophical views of the eighteenth century French rationalists. They believed that man was basically good and rational and that evil was a result of human ignorance. According to Karl's daughter, Eleanor, her father knew Voltaire and Rousseau by heart and was "steeped in the free French ideas of the eighteenth century on politics, religion, life, and art."[3]

Another important influence in Marx's early life was his future father-in-law, the Baron von Westphalen, who lived near the Marx family home in Trier. The Baron was a well educated man who read and spoke several languages. Marx's daughter compared the Baron's influence on Karl with that of her grandfather. According to Eleanor, the Baron "filled Karl Marx with enthusiasm for the romantic school, and whereas, his father read Voltaire and Racine with him, the Baron read him Homer and Shakespeare. . . ."[4] Marx maintained a fondness for Shakespeare throughout his life, and often read the Englishman's works to his children, who came to know whole scenes by heart.

Marx's formal schooling began in Trier, where he first attended high school in 1830. The chief influence in Marx's high school was Hugo Wyttenbach, who was a friend of Marx's family. He educated his pupils in a liberal atmosphere which was much unlike that prevailing in the other Prussian high schools. Marx received a typically humanistic education em-

phasizing languages and religion. During his four years there, he studied Latin, Greek, French, religion, math, and history.[5]

After high school most of the students from Trier went to Bonn, the closest university town. Marx enrolled in law school at Bonn in 1835. While at Bonn, he attended lectures in philosophy and literature. The intellectual atmosphere at the University was thoroughly romantic; partly due to the political repression and censorship by the Prussian state, politics were scarcely discussed. Marx was an industrious student, although his work seldom excelled. During the second term, he became ill from over-work and neglect and was forced to reduce his academic load. Outside of his formal studies, Marx enjoyed writing poetry and was also involved in such extra-curricular activities as beer drinking and brawling. Karl's father was not impressed with his son's performance for the year and decided that he should transfer to Berlin.

When Marx arrived in Berlin he had a strong interest in philosophy and law. While at the University he studied science, art, history, law, and philosophy. He also studied English and Italian. On the whole, Marx was hardly as industrious as he had been at Bonn. In fact, he stayed so aloof to the formal university that in the end he received his degree, not from Berlin, but from the University at Jena, an institution known for its facilitating the obtaining of a Ph.D.

After receiving his degree from the University of Jena, in April 1841, Marx commuted between Trier, Bonn, and Cologne searching for job opportunities and involving himself in political discussion groups. It was during this time that he began to collaborate with other writers for the journalistic organs of the Young Hegelians. His talents came to be known in these political circles, and, in 1842, he was invited to assume the editorship of the liberal Rhineland newspaper, the Rheinische Zeitung.

Marx's Early Writings: 1842-1844

Marx's writings in the period between 1842-1844 contain few direct comments on the subject of education. His philosophical views, in general, had not yet been systematically presented. During these early journalistic years, his writing involved contemporary controversies and discussions on religion, politics, and the state. It was in this context that any of his views related to education appeared at all. Therefore, the study of his educational ideas in his early writings necessarily begins with his discussions on religion and the state.

In 1842, as editor of the Rheinische Zeitung, Marx discussed public education and its relationship to religion and the state. In the essay,"Leading Article in No. 179 of the Kolnische Zeitung," he criticized the views of a conservative editor of a rival newspaper. Attacking the dominate conception of religion as the basis of state, he held that the state is based "upon the rational character of freedom."[6] To support his position, Marx described the rational content and purposes of public education by the state. This article is interesting not only because it uses the term "education," specifically, but also because some of the ideas which Marx expressed at this time appeared later in his explicit doctrine on education.

After his editorship of the Rheinische Zeitung, Marx collaborated with Arnold Ruge, a radical philosopher and publicist, to establish a journal which would propogate their new communist world outlook. In a correspondence to Ruge in 1843, Marx described the importance of religious criticism for socialist theory:

> . . . And again the whole socialist principle is only one facet of the true reality of the human essence. We have just as much to take into account the other facet, the theoretical existence of man, and make religion, science, etc. the object of our critique.[7]

Marx knew that this was a decisive theoretical turn, and that ultimately philosophy itself must be transcended. He declared that the limitation of previous speculative philosophy could be "summed up thus: it thought it could realize philosophy without transcending it."[8] That is, fundamental questions concerning man's existence could not be resolved by theoretical deliberation alone. For Marx, there was only one solution:

> . . . the criticism of the speculative philosophy of law cannot end with itself, but in tasks for which there is only one solution: praxis.[9]

The concept of "praxis" is a central aspect of Marx's educational thought. It was used to express his view of the theory/practice relationship. In the explicit texts on education, it reappears as "revolutionary practice."[10] According to Marx's conception of praxis, theory becomes revolutionary when it moves beyond theoretical criticism to consider man's real life conditions.

Marx believed that there was only one class among the

masses who were capable of making theory a material force. This class was the proletariat, because in the proletariat, as a class, are summed up the conditions of real life, and the situation of humanity, itself:

> . . . This class can no longer lay claim to a historical status, but only to a human one. It is not in a one-sided opposition to the consequences of the German political regime, it is in total opposition to its presuppositions. It is, finally, a sphere that cannot emancipate itself without emancipating itself from all other spheres themselves. In a word, it is the complete loss of humanity and thus can only recover itself by a complete redemption of humanity. This disolution of society, as a particular class, is the proletariat.[11]

Therefore, when theory abandons abstraction and is put "in the service of history,"[12] it may become a weapon in the hands of the proletariat. Again, man's existence is theoretical and practical. To change the conditions of man's existence, philosophy must be practical and the proletariat must be theoretical. Only through <u>praxis</u> is this revolutionary relationship possible:

> The emancipation of Germany is the emancipation of man. The head of this emancipation is philosophy, its heart is the proletariat. Philosophy cannot realize itself without transcending the proletariat, the proletariat cannot transcend itself without realizing philosophy.[13]

Also, in the early texts, the importance of Marx's conception of man's practical and theoretical existence for education was suggested in the "Critical Marginal Notes on the Article by a Prussian":

> . . . "Why does the King of Prussia not at once issue a decree for the education of all uncared-for children?" Does the "Prussian know what the King would have to decree? Nothing less than the <u>abolition of the proletariat</u>. In order to educate children they have to be <u>fed</u> and freed from <u>wage-labour</u>. The feeding and education of the <u>entire rising generation</u> of the proletariat, would be the <u>abolition</u> of the proletariat and pauperism.[14]

In Marx's view, the relationship between man's theoretical ex-

istence and practial life is such that revolutionary changes in one sphere must necessarily correspond with revolutionary changes in the other, for example, in the above case of education and the class system. This idea is also found his explicit doctrine on education.

Throughout these early writings, Marx's ideas on education were presented in the context of his criticism of religion and politics. Marx's faith in human reason and his conception of man's existence as theoretical and practical were established as premises of his outlook. In addition, his emphasis upon praxis, as the unity of theory and practice and as an essential relationship for revolutionary development, is important to the development of his educational theory.

The Philosophical and Theoretical Basis: 1844-1848

In the period 1844-1848, Marx's interest in the scientific study of political economy increased. It is also in this period that he established his ideas on communism and developed the materialist conception of history. It is in his writings on political economy, communism, and history that the philosophical and theoretical basis of his explicit doctrine on education was established.

Although the terms "education" and "schools" do not appear in the text, it was in The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 that Marx established the philosophical basis of his later doctrine on education. In this particular work, Marx posited his philosophical views of man, nature, society, and history. In addition, he discussed several concepts which are directly related to his thoughts on education, such as consciousness, theory, science, humanism, etc.

Marx's educational philosophy is based upon the view of man as a natural being, whose theoretical consciousness, including language and thought, is social and reflected in material production. Additionally, his emphasis on material production as the reflection of man's practical consciousness figures centrally in his philosophy of education. These foundational premises are included in his conceptions of history, communism, socialism, and science, and in his analysis of alienation and social production. Furthermore, his view of communist theory as practical and his concept of praxis, as the revolutionary relationship of theory to practice, are included in the foundation of his philosophy of education.

In addition to the 1844 Manuscripts, the foundation of Marx's educational ideas were also found in the Theses on

Feuerbach and The German Ideology.[15] The Theses were written in the spring of 1845, and The German Ideology was begun later that same year; consequently, there is considerable congruence between these two texts, with many of the ideas introduced in the Theses elaborated upon in the Ideology.

With respect to the study of Marx's educational theory, the Theses are important because they contain the only specific reference to education in these philosophical and theoretical writings of the period 1844-1848. Furthermore, in this text is posited a major theoretical problem concerning the relationship between the development of consciousness and the process of social change, indicating Marx's awareness of Robert Owen's educational theory.[16]

The German Ideology is also important to the study of Marx's educational theory because in this text Marx further developed the premises established in the 1844 Manuscripts. It is in this text that he introduced the materialist conception of history as the scientific basis of the communist movement. Because of the importance of The German Ideology for the development of Marx's theories as a whole, there is an additional significance to his educational ideas which were presented in this text.

The Explicit Doctrine on Education: 1848 and After

Herein designated "Marx's explicit doctrine on education" most of Marx's specific comments on education were found in his writings which post-date 1848. Coinciding with his political activities and empirical studies, it is in the writings of this period that Marx posited his ideas on practical educational matters, such as the curriculum of working-class schools, the relationship between the state and public education, and the costs and financial support for public schools. In these texts, he also discussed education and concepts such as the division of labor, science, ideology, and the communist movement.

Published in 1848, one of the primary purposes of The Communist Manifesto was to educate the international working classes.[17] Therefore, it is significant that Marx addressed the question of education in this particular text. In fact, it is The Manifesto that Marx directly applied the "materialist conception of consciousness"[18] to the specific subject of education; and, for the first time, he also posited his explicit doctrine concerning communist educational practice.

Although Marx's practical educational program was not presented in detail in this text, it is singularly important

that he listed education among those measures which "are unavoidable as a means of entirely revolutionizing the mode of production."[19] This inclusion suggests that Marx considered the development of man's consciousness through education as an essential component of the communist agenda.

Abolishing the division of labor is a revolutionary and historical pre-condition for the actualization of Marx's concept of the fully developed human being. It is through abolishing the division of labor that the ideological forms of man's consciousness are replaced by a unified human and natural science. Education plays an important role in abolishing the old division of labor and in the development of this new form of human consciousness. Included in Marx's concept of technical instruction, is the development through education of human and natural science, which shall replace the separation of mental and material labor. This conception is found in Marx's discussion of schools and the division of labor in Capital:

> . . . Though the Factory Act, that first and meagre concession wrung from capital, is limited to combining elementary education with work in the factory, there can be no doubt that when the working-class comes into power, as inevitably it must, technical instruction, both theoretical and practical, will take its proper place in the working-class schools. There is also no doubt that such revolutionary ferments, the final result of which is the abolition of the old division of labour, are diametrically opposed to the capitalistic form of production, and to the economic status of the labourer corresponding to that form.[20]

According to Marx's doctrine, education, particularly technical instruction, provides the means by which the working class may abolish the division of labor and the corresponding "fragmented" laborer. Moreover, it leads to the development of the whole human being:

> . . . Modern industry, indeed, compels society, under penalty of death, to replace the detail-worker of today, crippled by life-long repetition of one and the same trivial operation, and thus reduced to the mere fragment of a man, by the fully developed individual, fit for a variety of labours, ready to face any change of production, and to whom the different social functions he performs, are but so many modes of giving free scope to his own natural and acquired powers.

> One step already spontaneously taken towards effecting this revolution is the establishment of technical and agricultural schools, and of "ecoles d'enseignement professional", in which the children of the working men receive some little instruction in technology and in the practical handling of the various implents of labour.[21]

In 1869 in a political discussion on the communist program for education, Marx also discussed the relationship of science to education. Marx pointed out, in this meeting, that technological education was not only a training issue, but tied directly to the worker's overcoming the deficiencies produced by the division of labor:

> The technological training advocated by proletarian writers was meant to compensate for the deficiencies occasioned by the division of labor which prevented apprentices from acquiring a thorough knowledge of their business. This had been taken hold of and misconstrued into what the middle class understood by technical education.[22]

In The German Ideology, the concept of ideology represented the form of man's theoretical consciousness, which historically developed with the separation of mental and material labor. Included in this conception were religion, political science, philosophy, abstract theory, and the like. Other consequences of the division of labor were also included within the sphere of ideology such as the state and the contradiction between individual and social interests. Therefore, in Marx's explicit doctrine on education, the concept of ideology represented the forms of man's theoretical consciousness in the sphere of mental production, in contrast to his conception of science, as the form of man's practical and theoretical consciousness in the sphere of material production. Accordingly, when ideology is abolished from education, i.e., when the division of labor is abolished and with it the separation of mental and material production, then science will assume its proper place in the development of human consciousness and human society.

Marx's objection to ideological influences in public education is rooted in the materialist conception of consciousness. Class, church, state, and party are each ideological forms of human consciousness, and maintain the effects of the division of labor. Obviously, the working class must oppose ruling class ideas in their educational system. Although as Marx suggested in The Communist Manifesto, the state represents a temporary apparatus by which the working class can gain political control of schools, the state must be opposed from any influence in the educational process.

It is in the "Instructions for the Delegates of the Provisional General Council of the First International", in 1866, that Marx gave the fullest presentation of his specific plans for education. He supported the idea that juveniles of both sexes should contribute to social production. Beginning with age of 9, every able-bodied person should contribute to the rational society. Furthermore, he described how the combination of labor and education should apply to youth depending upon their age. Accordingly, he divided them into three classes: 9 to 12, 13 to 15, and 16-17. He also noted that it was desirable to start education before the age of 9; but because the workers must begin with the tendencies of the present system, they should start from 9.[23]

In addition, Marx explained that:

> By education we understand three things.
>
> First: Mental education.
>
> Second: Bodily education, such as is given in schools of gymnastics, and by military exercise.
>
> Third: Technological training, which imparts the general principles of all processes of production and simultaneously initiates the child and young person in the practical use and handling of the elementary instruments of all trades.
>
> A gradual and progressive course of mental, gymnastic, and technological training ought to correspond to the classification of the juvenile laborers. The costs of the technological schools ought to be partly met by the sale of their products.
>
> The combination of paid productive labor, mental education, bodily exercise, and polytechnic training will raise the working class far above the level of the higher and middle class.
>
> It is self-understood that the employment of all persons from nine to seventeen years (inclusively) in night work and all health-injuring trades must be strictly prohibited by law.[24]

In summary, Marx's explicit doctrine on education included his previously established philosophical and theoretical ideas, as well as his specific suggestions for communist education. After 1848, in his specific writings on education and schools, Marx utilized the materialist conception of history and con-

sciousness, the concepts of the division of labor, ideology and science. His specific suggestions for communist education were recorded in political meetings of the International Working Men's Association. They include demands for technological training, both theoretical and practical, mental education, gymnastic, and education combined with productive labor. Additionally, Marx supported the inclusion of rational subjects, such as the physical sciences and grammar; but in public schools he was opposed to any ideological influences in the schools, including those of religion, class, party, and the state.

Conclusion

If education was important to Marx and he was also aware of the works of major educational philosophers, why is it that he never addressed a single essay entirely to the subject? Several reasons for this theoretical void are suggested.

The first reason may be tied to this history of education. Formal educational institutions were scarcely developed in Germany by the nineteenth century. During the first half of the nineteenth century formal education was a limited social institution. Primarily limited to the upper and middle class, relatively few citizens received any formal schooling. Education was controlled by the Church and the State, and was chiefly concerned with the training of ministers and civil servants. Because of his middle class status, Marx was one of the few of his times to receive a formal education. Marx's attention to the other major social institutions, such as the Church, State, and the economic system, may have overshadowed his concern for the underdeveloped system of schooling. In support of this explanation is the fact that during the second half of the century when public education began to include the interest of the masses, Marx did concern himself with educational policies that would benefit on behalf of the working class movement. It was therefore not until this later period that Marx's educational doctrine was presented.

Secondly, Marx's attention to educational philosophy may have been a result of his theoretical indebtedness to Hegel's philosophical system. Marx's intellectual career began with the critique of Hegel's philosophy; consequently, the theoretical problems he addressed were those introduced by Hegel. However, Hegel never wrote an explicit treatise on educational philosophy.[25] Consequently, the marginality of the subject of education in Hegel's work may have directly affected Marx's attention to the philosophy of education.

Finally, Marx's association with the Young Hegelians may have also influenced his work on education. Traditionally there has been an association between a career in teaching and a concern with the philosophy of education. Unfortunately, the political notoriety which Marx's associates attracted, i.e., young Hegelians, B. Bauer in particular, contributed to the course of events by which he was excluded from an appointment and career in teaching.[26] As an alternative career, journalism, on the other hand, led him away from a direct concern with educational philosophy. Again, it should be noted that later when Marx was involved with the political education of the working classes, he brought forward his ideas regarding educational theory and practice.

In closing, I hope that I have contributed to Dr. Pacheco's call for further study of Marx's ideas on education. Obviously, this task is only just begun.

FOOTNOTES

1. See Michael C. Smith, "Karl Marx's Philosophy of Education: A Reconstruction of Marx's Idea on Education." (Unpublished dissertation, Marquette University, 1979).

2. David McLellan, Karl Marx: His Life and Thought. New York: Harper Row, 1973, p. 2.

3. Quoted in McLellan, Life and Thought, p. 6.

4. Ibid., p. 15.

5. Boris Nicolaievsky and Otto Maenchen-Helfen, Karl Marx: Man and Fighter. Translated by Gwenda David and Eric Mosbacher, London: Penguin Press, 1973, p. 13.

6. Karl Marx: Selected Writings, ed. David McLellan. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977, p. 19.

7. Ibid., p. 37.

8. Ibid., p. 68.

9. Ibid., p. 69.

10. See particularly the third thesis in "Theses in Feuerbach."

11. Selected Writings, ed. McLellan, p. 73.

12. Ibid., p. 64.

13. Ibid., p. 73.

14. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works. New York: International Publishers, 1975, 3: 196-7. The article was originally published in Vorwarts', No. 66, 17 August 1844.

15. See Collected Works, Vol. 5, New York: International Publishers, 1975.

16. Specifically the third thesis.

17. In the "Preface to the English Edition of 1888," Frederick Engels commented on the success of their educational effort, "it (the Manifesto) is undoubtedly the most widespread, the most international production of all socialist

literature, the common platform acknowledged by millions of workingmen from Siberia to California." See Basic Writings on Politics & Philosophy, ed. by Lewis S. Fever. New York: Anchor Books, 1959, p. 3.

18. The "materialist conception of consciousness": namely, that man's consciousness is practical and determined by material conditions.

19. The Communist Manifesto, 1888 Eng. ed., ed. Frederick Engels, trans. Samuel Moore. Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965, p. 57.

20. Capital, ed. Frederick Engels, trans. S. Moore and E. Aveling. New York: International Publishers, 1967, 1: 488.

21. Ibid.

22. On the First International, ed. Padover. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973, pp. 146-147.

23. Ibid., p. 26.

24. Ibid., pp. 26-27.

25. See Millicent Mackenzie, Hegel's Educational Theory and Practice. Westport, CO: Greenwood Press, 1970.

26. Bruno Bauer, one of the leading members of the Doctor's Club, was censored and later released altogether from his appointment to University teaching. Marx was counting on his relationship to Bauer, and therefore went down the tubes with his colleague's detachment from teaching.

PAUL GOODMAN AS A TWENTIETH CENTURY ADVOCATE OF A SOCRATIC EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY

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> . . . it is not by wisdom that the poets create their works, but by a certain instinctive inspiration, like soothsayers and prophets, who say many fine things, but understand nothing of what they say.[1]

Preliminary Remarks on How Socrates and Plato Might Have Offered Different Solutions to the Educational Problem of Authority

In the last few centuries people such as Thomas Jefferson, R. G. Bury, H. G. Wells, Bertrand Russell, Karl Popper, and others have either tacitly or directly argued that the works of Plato provide the theoretical foundations for at least two distinct intellectual traditions which have influenced Western thought since the death of Socrates in 399 B.C. Although there is much disagreement between those who have studied the works of Plato, a number of individuals do view the Platonic dialogues as important partly because they provide the basis for understanding that Western thinkers can be divided into two major groups. Specifically, there are those who can be viewed as followers of Socrates, and there are those who have been critics of the Socratic intellectual tradition. Moreover, one of the true ironies of Western thought is that Socrates' famous student Plato eventually argued against many of the basic assumptions of a Socratic philosophical perspective; in his later works such as the Republic and the Laws, Plato breaks with the Socratic tradition and argues for ideas which are similar to those advocated by the intellectual enemies of Socrates. Thus, since Socrates never recorded his ideas in written form, Plato's earlier works such as the Apology and the Crito have become some of our best resources for understanding the basic ideas of a Socratic intellectual perspective.

One of the great voids in the history of Western thought is first hand information about the ideas developed by Socrates. In addition, since it now appears that Plato eventually disagreed with the Socratic answers to a vast variety of philosophical, political, and educational problems, we can now only offer conjectures about how Socrates might have answered a critic such as Plato. However, if we ignore the finder details in the potential dialogue between Socrates and

Plato, it seems reasonable to suggest that these two men would have offered contradictory answers to a question such as, "Are there some authorities which can be consistently relied upon to tell students what they should do and learn in school?" This question can be referred to as the educational problem of authority. Also, for those who argue for some variation of the Socratic educational philosophy hinted at in Plato's Apology, this problem needs to be answered negatively. On the other hand, for those who endorse a version of the Platonic educational philosophy outlined in the Republic and the Laws, the educational problem of authority needs to be answered affirmatively.

As with the Sophists who disagreed with Socrates in the fourth century B.C., Plato and his student Aristotle eventually argued that human beings could somehow identify wise individuals who could be relied upon to control the educational process of the young. Unlike Socrates who openly admitted that his wisdom was worth little or nothing at all, the Sophists, Plato, Aristotle, and a whole host of influential Western educational theorists have assumed that it is possible to identify certain people as reliable and wise educational authorities who should control what students learn and do in a school. As it turns out, the Socratic views on educational authorities have not yet had much of an influence on the way schools have been organized in Western societies and to this day people usually assume that it is reasonable to provide an affirmative answer to questions such as the educational problem of authority.

Socrates' views on educational authorities have been unpopular partly because it is difficult for people to accept the idea that all levels of human understanding are far from a state of true wisdom; for the followers of Socrates, whatever is known at any moment in time should not be seen as wisdom, but instead it can be said that Socrates argued for the notion that all human knowledge is a form of ignorance. And although Socratic teachers may at times claim that their ignorance is better than the ignorance of their students, teachers following in the tradition of Socrates must always admit that what they know or think is not valuable knowledge. In other words, the views attributed to Socrates as he is described in Plato's Apology suggest that even the remarkable ideas developed by people such as Newton and Einstein are worth little or nothing at all when we take absolute truth as the goal of human inquiry. For Socrates, absolute truth is an unattainable goal which people may wish to strive for throughout their lives. Moreover, the Socrates of the Apology seems to suggest that the human search for absolute truth and wisdom is a worthwhile endeavor even though this quest is doomed to fail.

Statement of Central Problems and an Overview of the Argument

There are many complex historical, philosophical, sociological, and psychological reasons for why the Socratic views on educational authorities have had only a slight impact on the dominant intellectual traditions in Western educational thought. Unfortunately, I will not be able to use this short paper as a means to provide a detailed account about how the Platonic views on educational authorities have almost completely overshadowed the Socratic way of answering a question such as the educational problem of authority. But inspite of all the limitations of this essay, I do wish to use this work as a vehicle for beginning a dialogue about the question, "Can a Socratic educational philosophy be made relevant for some of the schools in Western liberal democratic countries such as the United States, Canada, and England?" This question can conveniently be labeled the Socratic educational problem. For the remainder of this essay I would like to discuss some of the difficulties associated with being a modern advocate of a Socratic educational philosophy. In particular, my plan here is to suggest that the educational writings and proposals of Paul Goodman help us understand why the Socratic views on schooling have been poorly understood and argued for by twentieth century Western educational theorists.

Throughout this essay I will suggest that Goodman's educational writings are important partly because they provide us with one attempt to demonstrate that a Socratic educational philosophy is relevant for twentieth century schooling. Whereas Goodman does not rank as an outstanding American educational theorist in the same sense as a person as John Dewey, it can be argued that Goodman's intellectual achievements help us to see how we might begin the difficult task of criticizing influential American Educational theorists such as Dewey. In other words, if we ignore the many and obvious shortcomings of Goodman's educational writings, we may find that his views on schooling can aid us in understanding the modern version of the dialogue between the followers of Socrates and Plato. Thus, if our goal is to see how twentieth century scholars have answered questions such as the Socratic educational problem, then Goodman's work can be seen as historically significant because, unlike most influential Western educational theorists, Goodman had a grasp of the idea that a Socratic educational philosophy could be made relevant for modern schools.

Briefly stated, a central aim of this essay is to explain that it is reasonable to consider the idea of updating the educational philosophy advocated by Socrates as he is described in Plato's Apology. And although it would be foolish of me to think that this short essay will convince large numbers of people to reject educational ideas that contradict those attributed to Socrates, I nevertheless wish it to be known that my sympathies are with Goodman and all other individuals who

have made an effort to develop educational programs which do not allow a few "wise" human beings to determine what is learned in a school. As with Socrates, Goodman, and the other Socratic educational thinkers over the ages, I endorse the notion that schools should recognize that it is a mistake to give the "wisest" among us the power and authority to decide what others should learn and teach in a school.

Toward Understanding the Way in Which a Platonic View of Educational Authorities Has Dominated Western Thinking About Schooling and Goodman as a Person Who Failed to Offer Adequate Arguments in Favor of a Socratic Educational Philosophy

Since the time of Plato the conventional wisdom in Western societies has slowly come to assume that it is "natural" to have the wisest people determine school activities. As it turns out, a Platonic view of educational authorities has been rarely challenged by those interested in educational programs for the young and it is often the case that people will not bother to be critical of an affirmative answer to questions such as the educational problem of authority (i.e. Are there some authorities which can be consistently relied upon to tell students what they should do and learn in school?). Whereas Western liberal thinkers have often been critical of the Platonic views on political authorities, it has generally been the case that liberal political theorists have not challenged Plato's ideas on educational authorities; one of the quirks in the history of Western liberal thought is that as a rule liberals have either directly or tacitly endorsed illiberal and Platonic answers to questions, such as the educational problem of authority. Thus, liberals who have argued for the idea of viewing political authorities as unreliable, have not usually endorsed the notion of viewing educational authorities as unreliable.

A thorough history of Western liberalism is beyond the scope of this essay, but it does need to be noted here that the schools in Western liberal societies have often been guided by illiberal ideas. Moreover, although liberal democratic societies have created political institutions which allow individuals to be personally responsible for many decisions which directly concern a person's life, it seems to be the case that the educational institutions in liberal societies have been very hesitant to give young people the opportunity to be personally responsible for making decisions which affect a person's life and school. In a sense it is correct to say that the dominant educational institutions in liberal democratic societies provide inadequate preparation for being an individual who is personally responsible for one's own actions and decisions. In regard to how the institutions in the United States have subverted the politi-

cal ideals of liberals such as Jefferson, it is worthwhile to note that in the preface to his book Utopian Essays and Practical Proposals Goodman noted the following:

> The idea of Jeffersonian democracy is to educate its people to govern by giving them initiative to run things, by multiplying sources of responsibility, by encouraging dissent . . . . Through the decades, it should have been the effort of our institutions to adapt this idea to ever changing technical and social conditions. Instead, as if by a dark design, our present institutions conspire to make people inexpert, mystified, and slavish . . . . Recently, the Commissioner of Education of the State of New York spoke of the need for young people to learn how to "handle constructively their problems of adjustment to authority" -- a remarkable expression for doing what you're told. Then I have heard young people in a philosophy class express their resentment against Socrates as a moral aristocrat who had principles to decide his behavior, whereas "most people are not up to that." To them there are apparently different grades of humanity.[2]

Goodman would occasionally hint at the notion that aspects of a Socratic philosophical perspective are indeed relevant for people living in the twentieth century. Specifically, in a number of his nonfiction works, Goodman alluded to the idea that it is desirable for modern human beings to act in accord with the Socratic principle that individuals should be personally responsible for determining many of the decisions and actions which directly affect one's life. Furthermore, Goodman saw that Jefferson and many of the other eighteenth century American Revolutionaries attempted to create a society which would give individuals the opportunity to be personally responsible for a vast variety of decisions which directly affect one's life and society. And in a sense it is correct to say that Goodman suggested that the American Revolution helped to further some of the causes which Socrates fought for throughout his life.

It is unfortunate that Goodman did not bother to explain in detail the connection between a Socratic educational philosophy and a Jeffersonian political perspective. As it turns out, Goodman's educational ideas relied to a great extent on the political views of Jefferson; in a very real sense Goodman argued that schools should become liberal democratic communities which operated in accord with the notion that all school members, students included, should be personally responsible for making decisions which affect one's life and school. Now, it should not be a surprise to find out that Jefferson's po-

litical theories are consistent with some of the ideas advocated by Socrates because in a number of ways the American Revolution helped to further the liberal democratic ideals which guided the Athenian society during much of Socrates' life time. However, it does need to be remembered that Socrates disagreed with most of the other teachers in his society about the notion that students should be personally responsible for what they learned; we should not forget that Socrates was a rare exception during the time in which he lived and his educational ideas chllenged the well established notion that teachers were reliable authorities who knew what students should learn.

Socrates lived at a time when traditional teachers such as the Sophists claimed that they knew valuable truths which all students should learn. Nevertheless, it is to Socrates' credit that he realized that the Sophists had claimed far too much for the knowledge they possessed. And throughout his life Socrates attempted to show the Sophists and many of his other intellectual opponents that they had erred when they claimed to be wise men who knew the truth. But it is not always an easy matter to refute the "truths" of wise men and since the time of Socrates a number of human beings have claimed to know the truth. For example, eighteenth and nineteenth century thinkers such as Jefferson thought that Newton had discovered absolute truths about how the universe operated; for Jefferson and most other enlightened eighteenth and nineteenth century thinkers Newtonian scientific theories were considered absolute truths which would never be refuted. Thus, when Jefferson wrote his famous "Bill for the More General Diffusion of Knowledge" in 1779, he assumed that some human beings could be identified as reliable educational authorities who know valuable truths which all children should learn.

As with most other Western educational theorists, Jefferson would follow Plato in assuming that it is possible to identify some human beings as reliable educational authorities. And with the rare exceptions of people such as A. Bronson Alcott, Homer Lane, and Paul Goodman, most American educational theorists have followed Jefferson in assuming that it is reasonable to offer an affirmative answer to the educational problem of authority. Moreover, the few American Socratic educational thinkers have not offered systematic arguments which explain why it is desirable to have elementary and secondary educational programs which are liberal democratic learning communities. As it turns out, the works of Alcott, Lane, Goodman, and the few other American Socratic educational philosophers have not yet had much of an impact on schooling in the United States. Nevertheless, it is to Goodman's credit that he made an effort to create a dialogue about the need for modern schools to adopt a Socratic view

of learning and in a letter written to the New York State Commissioner of Education, Goodman suggested the following:

> It has been my universal experience that formal preparation of a lesson plan beyond the next hour or two is not only unrealistic but can be positively harmful and rigidifying, for it interferes with the main thing, the contact between the teacher and his class. . . Our model must always be the Socratic dialogue, for the aim is not to convey some information but to get the information across as part of the student's nature and second nature, so he can make an individual and creative use of it.[3]

Goodman's defense of a Socratic educational philosophy was unsuccessful partly because he never bothered to explain unconventional statements such as the one which suggested that it is unrealistic to plan a lesson "beyond the next hour or two." Since most students, teachers, and school administrators have only come in contact with the Platonic idea that educational authorities must make long range plans, it should not surprise us to find out that Goodman, as with Socrates before him, was viewed by many people as a crank. In addition, it now appears that Goodman greatly underestimated the task of explaining how Socratic educational ideas might be used to guide some twentieth century schools. That is, Goodman did not fully grasp the extent to which Platonic educational theories have been, and continue to be, a part of Western thinking. And Goodman errored when he assumed that Jefferson and other Western liberal thinkers would be sympathetic to the radical notion of having elementary and secondary schools that allowed young students to be personally responsible for what is learned and done in an educational program. As it turns out, Jefferson, as with many of the students who came in contact with Goodman, would unknowingly follow Plato in assuming that schools for the young could identify some individuals as reliable educational authorities.

In short, Goodman had a poor understanding of the fact that aspects of Platonic thinking have almost completely dominated Western educational thought for well over two thousand years. Also, Goodman did not grasp that an advocate of Socratic educational ideas would be confronted with an odd variety of intellectual opponents who would include Jefferson and many of the students Goodman wished to help. Unfortunately, Goodman did not systematically study the history of education in Western democratic societies and he never realized that Jefferson's "Bill for the More General Diffusion of Knowledge" was consistent with the ideas in Plato's Republic. And finally, since Jefferson's educational proposals contained a number of ideas which would eventually guide the public schools

in the United States, we should not be surprised to find out that most American shave found it difficult to understand unconventional educational theorists such as Goodman and the few other followers of the Socratic views on schooling that are outlined in Plato's Apology.

Goodman as an Educational Theorist Who Criticized Some of the Platonic Ideas in the Work of John Dewey and a Reconsideration of Dewey's Views on Educational Authorities

Much work needs to be done in order to see how Jefferson and other influential American thinkers have followed Plato in offering an affirmative answer to questions such as the educational problem of authority. What contemporary educational theorists should do is study the history of American educational thought with the aim of seeing if people such as Horace Mann, W. T. Harris, John Dewey, Jerome Bruner, and others have knowingly or unknowingly followed Plato in assuming that some people could be identified as reliable educational authorities. But, unfortunately, Goodman and the few other Socratic American educational theorists have yet to offer the kind of systematic scholarly work that would make it easy for people to see that a Socratic educational philosophy is indeed a viable alternative to the Platonic educational views outlined in the Republic.

Although Goodman was a prolific writer during his short life of nearly sixty-one years, it does need to be acknowledged that he never created an educational work that could be viewed as a modern classic. As it turns out, Goodman's educational essays were written in a highly impressionistic fasion and in many ways Goodman's nonfiction works were similar to the poetry he wrote throughout his life. Moreover, it is often very difficult to see the vast amount of study required to write books such as Growing Up Absurd. However, despite the many shortcomings in Goodman's educational essays, it does need to be noted that Goodman was a courageous scholar who did not back down from the challenge of trying to improve upon the ideas of influential American educational theorists such as John Dewey and Jerome Bruner. For example, in his essay "Compulsory Mis-education" Goodman explained some of his disagreements with Dewey and Bruner when he wrote the following:

> Professor Bruner and his associates do not . . . espouse democratic community. But I am afraid they will eventually find that also this is essential, for it is impossible to do creative work of any kind when the goals are pre-determined by outsiders and cannot be criticized and altered by the minds

> that have to do the work, even if they are youngsters. . . Authentic progressive education, meantime, has moved into new territory altogether. . . The new progressive theory is "Summerhill."
>
> The American Summerhill movement is modeling itself on A. S. Neill's school in England. . .
>
> Like Dewey, Neill stressed free animal expression, learning by doing, and very democratic community processes (one person, one vote, enfranchising small children!). But he also asserted a principle that to Dewey did not seem important, the freedom to choose to go to class or stay away altogether . . . the top-down dictated national plans and educational methods that are now the fad are quite irrelevant. And on the contrary, it is precisely the society of free choice, lively engagement, and social action of Summerhill and American Summerhill that are relevant and practical.[4]

Time does not permit a detailed critique of Goodman's highly interesting historical interpretation about how "authentic progressive education" has moved from the educational theories of John Dewey to the ideas advocated by A. S. Neill. What needs to be noted here is that Goodman had an inadequate understanding of the historical roots of the educational philosophy espoused by Neill; a careful reading of Neill's writings reveals that the educational theories used at Summerhill evolved from the work done in the experimental schools created by Homer Lane. Specifically, it was Lane who introduced Neill to the idea of having schools which are self-governing liberal democratic communities and Lane's work at reform schools in the United States and England helped Neill see that young children could learn worthwhile social and academic skills even if learning were made optional. In short, Lane's work in the first quarter of the twentieth century set the stage for the creation of schools that would allow students to be personally responsible for deciding whether or not they attended classes.

The kind of freedom given to the students at schools such as Summerhill is indeed unusual when we think about our more conventional educational programs. After all, what Lane, Neill, and Goodman have suggested is that schools for the young should grant young children academic freedom; for Lane, Neill and Goodman, young children should be allowed to determine their own learning activities in a manner similar to the way college professors are allowed to decide their research projects. Also, although Dewey argued for the idea that children needed greater freedom in the classroom, it does need

to be noted here that Dewey did not wish to give young children "the freedom to choose to go to class or stay away altogether." For Dewey, educational authorities such as teachers and curriculum developers were the ones best qualified to decide what children learned in school. And Dewey never wished to give children the opportunity to make adult determined classroom activities optional. In regard to his views on how teachers and other adults were expected to be responsible for determining what is learned in a school, we need only recall that in Experience and Education Dewey stated that

> When external control is rejected the problem becomes that of finding the factors of control that are inherent within experience. When external authority is rejected, it does not follow that all authority should be rejected, but rather that there is need to search for a more effective source of authority. Because the older education imposed the knowledge, methods, and rules of conduct of the mature person upon the young, it does not follow, except upon the basis of the extreme Either-Or philosophy, that the knowledge and skill of the mature person has no directive value for the experience of the immature. On the contrary, basing education upon personal experience may mean more multiplied and more intimate contacts between the mature and immature than ever existed in the traditional school, and consequently more, rather than less, guidance by others.[5]

Dewey wrote the above comments in 1938 when he was nearly eighty years old. And throughout his long and distinguished academic career Dewey would suggest that teachers and other adults had the primary responsibility for determining what is learned in a school. For Dewey, teachers were to control the educational process by providing children with direct experiences that demonstrated the value of "the knowledge and skills of the mature person." Furthermore, it seems that Dewey saw teachers as educational authorities who were to direct school learning by creating an environment which encouraged children to accept adult determined skills, values and ideas. In regard to how Dewey explained the role of teachers in the learning process, it is helpful to recall that in his essay "The Children and the Curriculum" Dewey claimed that

> The value of the formulated wealth of knowledge that makes up the course of study is that it may enable the educator to determine the environment of the child and thus by indirection to direct. Its primary value, its primary indication, is for the teacher, not for the child. It says to the teacher: Such an such are the capacities, the fulfillments, in truth and beauty and behavior, open to these

> children. Now see to it that day by day the conditions are such that their own activities move inevitably in this direction, toward such culmination of themselves. Let the child's nature fulfill its own destiny, revealed to you in whatever of science and art and industry the world now holds as its own.[6]

In his many educational works Dewey would develop his ideas about how teachers were to direct the learning process by indirection. And although he would disagree with eighteen and nineteen century scholars who thought that schools could transmit absolute truths to the young, it does need to be noted that Dewey argued for the notion that teachers should be responsible for creating a learning environment which allowed children to learn the "truths" revealed in whatever science, art, and industry "now holds as its own." Thus, it appears that Dewey viewed teachers and other adults as reliable educational authorities who should determine what students learn in school. And, as with many other Western liberals, Dewey tacitly endorsed an affirmative answer to the educational problem of authority (i.e., Are there some authorities which can be consistently relied upon to tell students what they should do and learn in school?).

Poets as Philosophers and Goodman as a Social Critic Who Used Poetry to Explain Why He Was as an Educational Reformer

Since Dewey's intellectual accomplishments are so vast, it is very difficult to conjecture how he would have answered a complex question like the educational problem of authority. As it turns out, Dewey made a number of qualifications about his views related to the role of teachers in an educational program. Moreover, it is highly likely that Dewey would have been very hesitant to engage in a dialogue over the educational problem of authority because it could be claimed that his question forces one to make an Either-Or choice. However, what Dewey and his followers have not fully realized is that some important questions do require that we make an Either-Or choice and it may be the case that people should at times engage in debates over questions similar to the educational problem of authority.

In his critique of Dewey's educational philosophy Goodman seems to suggest that Dewey made a mistake when he endorsed the idea that teachers and other adults should be given the responsibility for determining classroom activities. And although Goodman was a bit vague about why he rejected the notion that teachers should determine the school curriculum it is to Goodman's credit that he realized that children should

be given the opportunity to make significant changes in the predetermined curriculum that Dewey wished schools to teach to all children. As with Socrates before him, Goodman argued that teachers had highly inadequate wisdom; following in the Socratic tradition, Goodman suggested that students should be given the opportunity to criticize and alter the curriculum decisions advocated by adults. Specifically, by endorsing the notion that children should be given "the freedom to choose to go to class or stay away altogether," Goodman's educational proposals gave young people the power to have an effective way to check and significantly alter the curriculum designs created by adults.

Throughout his many educational essays Goodman argued that it is desirable to have elementary and secondary schools which allowed all human beings the opportunity to be personally responsible for what one learns in a school. Now, of course, the notion of having young people determine their own learning activities is an extremely unconventional idea which contradicts many of our more basic and traditional views about schools for the young. And given the unconventional nature of his ideas on schooling, a number of individuals have argued that Goodman was a romantic poet who advocated educational theories that are irrelevant for modern educational programs. However, what Goodman's critics have rarely understood is that poets are not necessarily romantic thinkers and at times poems may be nothing more than a novel way to deal with complex social and philosophical issues. In regard to how a poet might use his poems for philosophical reflection, it is worthwhile to note here that Dewey once made the following observation about the work of Matthew Arnold:

> The present separation of science and art, this division of life into prose and poetry, is an unnatural divorce of the spirit. It exists and endures, not because of a glow to life which philosophy cannot catch, nor because of a verifiable truth which poetry cannot detect and convey. It exists because in the last few centuries the onward movement of life, of experience, has been so rapid, its diversification of regions and methods so wide, that it has outrun the slower step of reflective thought. . . That which seemed to Mr. Arnold a flight from philosophy into poetry was in reality but a flight from a hard and partial philosophy to a fuller and freer one. It is not because poetry is divorced from science that it gave Mr. Arnold's nature such satisfaction, but because his philosophic instinct was so deep and real that he revolted from the professional philosophy of the day as he found

> it in Great Britain, and sought refuge in the unnamed, unprofessed philosophy of the great poets of England and of all time. . . We must bridge this gap of poetry from science. We must heal this unnatural wound.[7]

As with many poets both before and after him, Goodman "revolted from the professional philosophy of his day" because he did not wish to be restricted by the conventions which normally govern behavior in groups of academic philosophers. And Goodman's decision to be a renegade philosopher has made it difficult to understand his very unconventional educational philosophy; if Goodman had been more concerned with educational reform than his own freedom of expression, then he might have been willing to argue for unconventional educational ideas in a conventional manner. But Goodman made the decision to express unconventional philosophical ideas in an extremely unconventional fashion. Specifically, Goodman would at times use poems as a means to explain why he continued to advocate educational changes and in his poem "At Michigan State" he wrote the following:

> The old chaplain said, "You're strange. You talk so pessimistically and yet your tone--the way you are, proposing to change the schools and so--is optimistic."
>
> I puffed my pipe and mulled it. It was true. I talked out with a kind of energy. Now I said hesitantly, "My pessimism is only on account of evidence." --We smiled wryly at the epigram--"Obviously I must have animal faith or I couldn't sit here!" I shouted . . . "Who can afford," I ended wearily, "to be either pessimistic or optimistic? You have to do your duty anyway. A lot of my energy is rage."[8]

Goodman's rage often stood in the way of his efforts to explain why a socratic educational philosophy is needed in the twentieth century as much as it was needed during the time of Socrates. Unfortunately, Goodman was unable to demonstrate why we need a Socratic educational revolution in our modern world and in a sense it is correct to say that Goodman belonged to that group of poets "who say many fine things, but understand nothing of what they say."[9] That is, Goodman never realized that most people do not think that children are growing up absurd in the world as we know it and one of the true absurities in modern life is that so many of us have come to accept the absurd as normal.

A Concluding Remark

Goodman was unable to convince large numbers of people that it is reasonable to offer an affirmative answer to questions such as the Socratic educational problem (i.e., Can a Socratic educational philosophy be made relevant for some of the schools in Western liberal democratic countries such as the United States, Canada, and England?). And as with Socrates before him, Goodman can be viewed as an absurd educational theorist partly because he wanted to show wise people that they were really ignorant. Stated differently, the Socratic idea that wise human beings will readily see how ignorant they are is a myth. As it turns out, it takes much work and a great deal of luck to demonstrate to the wisest among us that no human beings are wise enough to be reliable educational authorites who should decide what all children learn in school. Furthermore, if we ever begin to realize that wise people should not be given the responsibility for determining school activities, then we may yet be able to have serious discussions about questions such as the following: Can schools for the young be guided by many of the central political ideals which have been argued for by Western liberals such as Jefferson? Is it reasonable to have elementary and secondary schools which give young children "the freedom to go to class or stay away altogether?" How can teachers and other adults make worthwhile contributions in schools that are run as liberal democratic learning institutions? Will children be able to learn survival skills and information in schools that do not have a standardized curriculum? Questions such as these will only make sense when people endorse the Socratic notion that wise human beings are far too ignorant to be made reliable educational authorities who determine what all children learn in a school. And the hope for a Socratic educational revolution rests on our ability to see that all human beings, even the greatest thinkers among us, are not individuals who have discovered knowledge that can be viewed as any kind of truth or wisdom.

FOOTNOTES

1. Plato, Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, trans. F. J. Church and Robert D. Dumming. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1956, p. 27.

2. Paul Goodman, Utopian Essays and Practical Proposals. New York: Vintage Books, 1962, p. xvii.

3. Paul Goodman, Growing Up Absurd. New York: Vintage Books, 1960, pp. 245-246.

4. Paul Goodman, Compulsory Mis-education and the Community of Scholars. New York: Vintage Books, 1962, pp. 44-48.

5. John Dewey, Experiences and Education. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1970, p. 21.

6. John Dewey, The Child and the Curriculum and the School and Society. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1968, p. 31.

7. John Dewey, Characters and Events. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1970, pp. 16-17.

8. Paul Goodman, Collected Poems. New York: Vintage Books, 1973, pp. 351-352.

9. See Footnote 1.

MIDWEST PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION SOCIETY

Officers:

President:	Adrian Dupuis Marquette University
Vice-President:	George Kizer Iowa State University
Sec'y Treasurer:	Ron Swartz Oakland University

Executive Committee:

Rosemary Donatelli	Loyola University
Philip Smith	The Ohio State University
Arthur Brown (ex-officio)	Wayne State University

Program Committee:

David L. Angus, Chairman	The University of Michigan
Terrence N. Tice	The University of Michigan
Jack Williams	University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee

Arrangements Committee:

Rosemary Donatelli	Loyola University
Walter Krolikowski	Loyola University

A G E N D A

for

1979 BUSINESS MEETING MWPES ANNUAL CONFERENCE
AT LOYOLA UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

I. Approval of Minutes of November 11, 1978 Business Meeting

II. Treasurer's Report

III. Constitutional Amendments

IV. New Business

MWPES ANNUAL CONFERENCE
UNIVERSITY OF MICHICAN, ANN ARBOR
November 10-11, 1978

Minutes, Business Meeting (November 11, 1978)

Old Business

1. Since the minutes of the 1977 business meeting were published and distributed to the membership, it was moved and seconded that the secretary omit reading of the 1977 minutes. Motion carried.

2. The Treasurer's Report was read and approved by the membership in attendance.

3. President Brown led a discussion on the publication of Society Proceedings. Merritt suggested including a "flyer" in mailings to membership asking for their assistance in securing library subscriptions at their institutions. Burnett suggested increasing the price of the Proceedings and placing an ad in Educational Theory for their sale. Radebaugh expressed support for continuing publication. Hetenyi moved (seconded by Radebaugh) that the Society be on record as favoring publication if financially feasible. Motion carried.

4. Kizer made a report on Society membership, as follows:

There are 150 members presently on the Society roll.
Of these, 14 joined in the 1977 year;
17 joined in the 1978 year;
33 paid dues in the 1976 year;
53 paid dues in the 1977 year; and
59 paid dues in the 1978 year.

5. Radebaugh made a report on the Constitution Revision Committee, consisting of Radebaugh, chm., Burnett, and Champlin. Recommended changes will be presented at the 1979 meeting. These changes are expected to be in line with the National PES Constitution. Members were asked for suggestions. It was recommended that interaction and dialogue be encouraged between philosophers of education and other disciplines, and that Associate Membership be made possible for students.

6. Merritt made the report of the nominating committee, composed of Merritt (chm.) Hetenyi, and Krolikowski, as follows:

President - Adrian Dupuis
Vice-president - George Kizer

Secretary-Treasurer - Ronald Swartz
Executive Committee - Philip Smith
Rosemary Donatelli

Motion to accept the recommendation of the committee was made by Merritt, and seconded by Burnett. There were no nominations from the floor, and the slate was elected by acclamation.

7. Merritt expressed appreciation for the outgoing officers, and suggested that letters of appreciation be sent to them and to officials at their institutions.

New Business

1. Burnett moved that letters of appreciation be sent to the Dean of the College of Education, University of Michigan, and to the members of the Arrangements Committee, composed of David Angus, chm., Cho Yee Too, and Andy Fanta. Seconded by Merritt. Motion carried.

2. Meeting adjourned.

CONSTITUTION OF THE MIDWEST PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION SOCIETY*

*This document contains the revisions which were recommended by the Constitutional Revision Committee. The suggested changes do not become effective until voted on at the Business Meeting to be held on Saturday, November 10, 1979 in the Regis Room of the Water Tower Campus of Loyola University of Chicago.

CONSTITUTION OF THE MIDWEST PHILOSOPHY
OF EDUCATION SOCIETY

Article I. NAME. The name of this organization shall be the "Midwest Philosophy of Education Society" (Hereinafter referred to as "The Society").

Article II. PURPOSES. The purposes of the Society are: (1) to promote the fundamental philosophic treatment of the problems of education; (2) to promote the clarification of agreements and disagreements among the several philosophies of education through the opportunities for discussion afforded by annual meetings; (3) to advance and improve teaching in philosophy of education, both in schools for the educationof teachers and in other educational institutions; (4) to cultivate fruitful relationships between workers in genral philosophy and workers in philosophy of education; (5) to cultivate fruitful relations between scholars in philosophy of education and those in other areas of education; and (6) to encourage promising young students in the field of philosophy of education.

Article III. MEMBERSHIP. Section 1. There shall be four classes of members: Fellows, Associates, Emeriti, and General.

Section 2. A Fellow in the Society shall be a Fellow of the national Philosophy of Education Society. A Fellow in the national Society is one who is making or has made a distinctive contribution to the field of philosophy of education and whose interests focus primarily in that field. One or more of the following criteria shall be used in determining the contribution and interest of a nominee for membership as a Fellow: (1) publications in the field of philosophy of education, (2) the teaching of collegiate courses in this field, and (3) the completion of a doctoral degree and dissertation in this field.

Section 3. An Associate in the Society shall be an Associate in the national Philosophy of Education Society or one who is in principle eligible for associate membership in the national Philosophy of Education Society. An Associate in the national Society is one who has demonstrated interest and competence in philosophy of education but who does not meet the criteria for Fellow. Graduate students meeting these qualifications shall be eligible for membership as Associate.

Section 4. Emeritus membership for Fellow shall be automatic on institutional retirement and entails retention of all privileges.

Section 5. General membership shall include those interested in philosophy of education but who are eligible for membership neither as a Fellow nor as an Associate. It shall also include those eligible for but not requesting membership as a Fellow or an Associate.

Section 6. All classes or members shall have equal right to the floor at regular meetings. Only dues-paying members shall have the right to vote.

Section 7. All Fellows, Associates, and Emeriti members of other regional societies affiliated with the national Philosophy of Education Society are automatically eligible for membership in the Midwest Philosophy of Education Society.

Section 8. Charter members of the Society are those Fellows of the Society who organized it by adopting the Constitution on December 3, 1960. The Secretary-Treasurer shall maintain a list of such members.

Article IV. OFFICERS. Section 1. The elected officers of the Society shall be a President, a Vice-President, a Secretary-Treasurer, and an Executive Committee. They shall be elected for two-year terms of office as vacancies occur. Only fellows are eligible to serve as President, and the President shall not be eligible to succeed himself in that office until at least two years from his retirement as President.

Interim appointments shall be made for the remainder of the original term of office.

Section 2. The President shall preside at the annual meeting; appoint with the approval of the Executive Committee a Program Committee and serve as an ex-officio member of that Committee; fill vacancies in unexpired terms of office with the approval of the Executive Committee; supervise the arrangements for the annual meeting(s) of the Society; and appoint a nominating Committee with the approval of the Executive Committee to produce a slate of officers for election.

Section 3. The duties of the Vice-President shall be to assist the President, to preside at the annual meeting in the absence of the President, and to assume the duties of the President in the event of his incapacity.

Section 4. The Secretary-Treasurer of the Society shall maintain records of the annual meeting(s) and minutes of the deliberations of the Executive Committee; maintain the files of membership; circulate official notices to the members regarding time and place and programs of annual meeting(s); correspond with new applicants for membership; attend the official correspondence of the Society; and collect dues from the membership and administer the expenditure of funds for the Society.

Section 5. The Executive Committee shall consist of the President of the Society, the Vice-President, the immediately retired President, the Secretary-Treasurer, and two elected Fellows of the Society. The duties of the Executive Committee shall include passing upon nominations for membership in the Society; authorizing and approving expenditures of the Society's funds; acting upon any resignations submitted by officers of the society; determining the time and place of meetings; and levying necessary fees.

Section 6. Elections may take place at any business meeting of the Society. A slate for the election of officers shall be presented by a nominating committee. Nominations for officers may also be made from the floor.

Article V. MEETINGS. The Society shall hold one annual meeting, that meeting to be held in the Fall of the year.

Article VI. AMENDMENTS. This Constitution may be amended in whole or in part by the following process: Proposed changes shall have the endorsement of at least two Fellows and must be submitted in writing to the Secretary-Treasurer; at least one month before any regular meeting the Secretary-Treasurer shall mail to all members of the Society an account of the proposed changes; and voting on these changes shall be in order of business at the next meeting of the Society. Proposed amendments must have the approval of two-thirds of the members present and voting.

Article VII. PROCEDURE. Where rules of procedure are not herein provided for, appeal may be made to Robert's Rules of Parliamentary Procedure.

Article VIII. DUES. The annual dues shall be set, with the restriction set out below, by a majority vote of the Executive Committee, but no change in the amount of dues shall apply until the fiscal year following that in which dues are set. Dues generally shall be the

same for Fellows, Associates, and General Members, but the Executive Committee may set dues for members retired from academic positions and/or for student members (independent of class of membership) at such lower rates as it deems appropriate.

Article IX. BY-LAWS. By-Laws of the Society may be changed by a majority of those voting at any annual business meeting of the Society.